Ansar Allah (a.k.a. The Houthis) have become increasingly prominent in the Gulf subcomplex for security and geostrategic reasons. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is among the most vital water routes in the world, with commodities shipped constantly between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The Houthis continuously disrupt the flow of goods in the strait, all while giving a powerful foothold to Tehran in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, it is crucial to analyse the relationship between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic of Iran, given that both represent elements of disruption and instability, not only for the GCC countries but also for the international community.

Ansar Allah was created in the 1990’s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a member of Yemen’s Zaydi Shia minority, which makes up about one-third of the population. […] The Zaydis, once a powerful force in northern Yemen, were alienated from the 1960’s onward, all while Salafist Sunni ideals gained prominence on the border with Saudi Arabia [1]. The Houthis claimed that the interference of Salafist Sunni ideals would in the end result to be a threat to their cultural and religious heritage. Hence, they started an armed resistance driven by internal discontent with additional social and economic disparities coming from the Yemeni context. The relationship between the two actors began in 2009 and strengthened in 2014 with the seizure of the capital Sana’a by the non-state group [2]. It must be underlined that Tehran did not play any role in the birth of the Yemeni-based group, but only afterwards saw them as an opportunity to put pressure on the GCC countries in the southern part of the Gulf subcomplex. For example, Hezbollah’s experience is inherently different, given that the group has been funded and supported by Tehran since its conception in the early 1980’s with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [3].

Tehran’s approach towards Yemen and the Houthis is pragmatic and, as underlined, fairly recent. Both the two groups are Shi’ites, that relate to two different schools of thought: the Yemeni-based group follows the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, while Iran ascribes to the Twelver Shi’ism branch. Nonetheless, the main driver in the relationship is the success of the Houthis in Yemen, a success exploited by Tehran to jump on the bandwagon in Sana’a. Given the group’s independent birth from Tehran, a relationship between the two is extremely advantageous: on one hand the Houthis can impose themselves as an independent and pragmatic actor, while implicitly carrying out Tehran’s stances; on the other hand, Iran can formally deny any allegation regarding the relationship standing between the two, while only defining it as cordial and positive. Plausible deniability is a crucial characteristic when supporting a proxy. On the flip side, Ansar Allah is also approaching this relationship pragmatically, given that they’re not recognized internationally as the government of Yemen, even if they control Sana’a and the

north-west of Yemen, including the Red Sea coastline where most of Yemen’s population lives, and they run a de facto government which collects taxes and prints money [4]. Hence, having a regional powerful supporter like Iran is crucial for them to stay relevant in the international theatre. Another critical element in this relationship relates to the shared interests between the two: the Houthis and Iran share the same anti-American and anti-Israeli worldview, and both want to limit the influence of Saudi Arabia [5], the former for the religious confrontation between the Zaydi Shi’ism and Salafist Sunni, the latter on the other hand expresses enmity mainly due to the seeking of predominancy in the region, aspired by both Saudi Arabia and Iran. What needs to be underlined in this context is that the Houthis pursue actions that simultaneously align with Iranian interests while furthering the movement’s own cultural preferences [6]. These are not the only elements to underline regarding the relationship between Iran and the Houthis: evidence of the material and economic support given by Tehran can be seen in the supply of weapons. A report written 2023 by a panel of experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council showed the consistent direct and indirect smuggling of weapons and arms between the two actors. The report underlines how a number of ammunition, assault rifles, missiles, components of surveillance systems and detonators have been seized by the United States, France, United Kingdom and the internationally recognized government of Yemen from either stateless dhows or smuggling vessels [7]. The vessels either transported weapons of Iranian manufacture or left from Iranian ports and had crews formed by Iranian nationals.

It can be concluded that the relationship between the two actors is strong: firstly, it meets Iran’s and Ansar Allah’s separate interests, the former to have a powerful foothold in the Gulf Peninsula, the latter to have a strong regional supporter; secondly, it meets their common interests, hence creating a united front against their strategic rival, Saudi Arabia, in the area and worldwide. They do all this while keeping independence between each other and plausible deniability regarding their relationship, enhancing its strength.

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The final chapter of the series on Yemen will focus on the future of the relationship between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the possible consequences for three main actors in the area: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Oman.