President, Economic Inclusion Group
On 10 December 2025, the US executed a highly unusual maritime law enforcement operation off the coast of Venezuela, boarding and seizing the oil supertanker “Skipper” in international waters as it carried nearly 1.8 million barrels of Venezuelan crude. The vessel, subject to longstanding US sanctions for its role in transporting sanctioned oil tied to Venezuela and Iran, was intercepted under a federal seizure warrant just before it was set to expire.
This strategy has been part of a broader US approach toward the Venezuelan regime, which included last Saturday’s (03 January 2026) operation in which US forces carried out a carefully planned, limited military and law-enforcement action to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, flying them to the US to face long-standing federal indictments on narcotics and related charges; US officials justified this move on grounds that Maduro headed a network responsible for large-scale drug trafficking and posed a persistent threat to US national security interests, and they framed the operation as targeting criminal leadership and undermining illicit revenue streams
Examining the lead-up to the 03 January operation will shed much light on where Venezuela stands now.
The seizure of oil tankers involved significant coordination across US agencies, including the Justice Department, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and US Coast Guard. Officially, the Trump administration stated that the seized tanker was destined for Cuba, yet my analysis suggests that China, the recipient of approximately 60% of Venezuela’s oil exports, was the more plausible destination. Indeed, tankers of such scale are typically deployed on long‑haul routes consistent with Asian markets.
This action is fundamentally reshaped the economics of Venezuela’s — under Maduro — oil exports by dramatically increasing the costs and complexities of trading Venezuelan crude. Already, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company, faced significant disruptions: cargoes stranded offshore, crude price collapse, and buyers urgently renegotiating spot contracts to include protective clauses against future US operations. Additionally, buyers are now demanding the unprecedented inclusion of “war clauses” in shipping contracts (provisions historically reserved for conflict zones or areas prone to piracy) to protect themselves from potential US seizures or forced diversions.
Against this backdrop and escalating risks, Venezuelan crude oil is less attractive, leading buyers to demand steeper discounts. Currently, Venezuelan oil is trading at as much as $21 per barrel below Brent crude, a steep deterioration from roughly $15 just a week prior, according to traders and maritime sources. This widening discount reflects not only the lower quality of Venezuelan heavy crude compared to lighter benchmarks but also a growing geopolitical risk premium. Buyers now factor in potential losses from seized cargoes, additional insurance costs, longer delays, and logistical disruptions into their pricing models.
Given that an average tanker carrying roughly two million barrels remains valued near $100 million even at discounted prices, the stakes are exceptionally high for all involved. Typically, oil shipments follow a “Free on Board” contract model, shifting financial risk to the buyer once the tanker departs port. With the threat of seizures looming, buyers are now demanding deeper discounts and more stringent contractual terms to offset these heightened risks. These new demands can include extended payment timelines, increased upfront financial guarantees, and additional protective insurance clauses, significantly complicating transactions and potentially excluding less-capitalized or risk-averse buyers from engaging with Venezuelan crude.
Maduro depended heavily on the “shadow fleet,” a clandestine network of vessels specifically designed to evade sanctions by disabling their transponders, falsifying location data, regularly changing flags, and obscuring ownership structures through shell companies. This shadow fleet was essential for Venezuela, enabling the Maduro regime to maintain oil exports despite extensive international sanctions. Globally, around 1,500 ships now participate in this opaque market, exploiting arbitrage opportunities created by sanctions, with Venezuela emerging as one of the fleet’s primary users.
Presently, nearly 11 million barrels of Venezuelan crude remain trapped aboard roughly 39 tankers anchored offshore, unable to discharge or be paid for until they can move. That oil represents potential cash flow that has evaporated into logistical gridlock, intensifying PDVSA’s financial strain and further eroding Maduro’s liquidity. The prolonged anchoring of these vessels incurs substantial daily costs, including anchorage fees, additional crew expenses, increased insurance premiums, and rising financing costs due to delayed transactions.
Oil revenue still accounts for about 88% of Venezuela’s export earnings, and years of economic collapse and policy mismanagement have effectively wiped out alternative sectors capable of generating hard currency. This means that even marginal shocks to oil prices, discounts, or volumes translate directly into macro‑level stress, constraining Maduro’s capacity to keep its state apparatus.
For these reasons, the US seizure significantly altered the economics of exporting Venezuelan oil. By increasing the costs and risks associated with these exports, Washington effectively complicated Maduro’s ability to finance his government through oil revenues and this led to a general weakening of his position, contributing to internal regime distrust and likely ushering in the conditions for the 03 January operation to remove Maduro from power.