The fall of the Assad regime in Syria dealt a blow to both Russia and Iran’s strategic position in the wider MENA region. For Iran, Syria holds significant strategic and logistical importance since it borders Lebanon, where Hezbollah — the crown jewels of Iran’s proxy army — is deeply entrenched. For Russia, Syria was a foothold for the expansion of its military power in the region and a vital stopover for its Mediterranean operations. By entering Syria’s Civil War (2015),^[i] Russia ensured, at the time, regime survival. Until now, Russia controls the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Base; however, such assets may be lost due to the Syrian Interim Government’s (SIG) new interests and allies including the recent reports that underline calls for the extradition of Bashar Al-Assad, who currently resides in Moscow under political asylum.^[ii]

For the most part, the SIG has decided to prioritise rebuilding Syria alongside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Western countries. On 12 January 2025, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting on Syria with GCC, Middle Eastern and Western countries, calling for humanitarian, economic, and political support as Syria is in a transitional stage.^[iii] With Assad’s former allies being isolated from the international forum which seeks to create a new Syria, what are the current options for Russia and Iran? This work seeks to identify some of the main ones.

For Russia, the main goal of retaining its operational pipeline between Sevastopol in the Black Sea and Tartus in the Mediterranean Sea is a key priority in Moscow’s quest to maintain its maritime society platforms and its energy transmission infrastructure. Indeed, the only viable mechanism to export Russian gas to East Mediterranean markets is the Turkstream pipeline, which runs through Türkiye—an important land-bridge.^[iv] Thus, the Turkstream pipeline increases Türkiye’s involvement in both Syria and Ukraine and it therefore becomes a part of the wider negotiations between Moscow and the EU/NATO. This has already manifested in Ankara’s insistence of denying the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) to gain a foothold in Syria.

The SIG looks to engage with regional and global players pragmatically in order to generate legitimacy and obtain financial support for state-building and reviving the national economy. SIG may still seek to engage with Moscow because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and Damascus would, likely, require Moscow’s acquiesce to rebuild Syria — for example, via UNSC Resolution 2254. This may translate into continued Russian leverage that may be wielded in the quest to secure its air and naval facilities.

For Iran the situation is very different. Tehran is not a permanent member of the UNSC and neither does it operate an international foreign policy. In fact, it may be argued that Iran’s main interest in reinforcing the Assad regime was singularly in relation to maintaining its Hezbollah militia and the vital supply lines to it. However, there could be an opportunity for Iran and Syria to openly engage with one another if Israel continues to make incursions into Syrian territory and there are no other available allies to help shore up Syrian defences. Similar to the Assad regime, the SIG could allow the movement of military supplies to Iranian proxies, if relations between Syria and Israel are not addressed during the transitional stage and the border is not secured.

While the future is impossible to predict, it is clear that both Moscow and Tehran have been caught off-guard with the rapid change of events in Syria. They are reeling from their loss of leverage in such a vital region but it is too soon to discount them as they both retain an assortment of tools that may still alter the fact on the ground.