For decades, the United States has been seen as the sole hegemon in the wider Middle East. For a long spell, this position was based on the combination of its power capabilities, the wide assortment of allies in the region and the lack of alternative and rival powers. However, over the last years a new great power is rising from the East with a consistent strategy focused on economic relations and development plans. Over the past 20 years, China’s relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members has flourished. In 2009, Chinese oil imports from the Gulf surpassed those of the US and has, since then, nearly tripled. However, the relationship goes both ways; GCC imports from China have mirrored this trend, tripling since 2008 with goods such as cars, 5G infrastructure, semiconductors, and microchips. Conversely, US exports to the region have flatlined while their oil imports have plummeted.

But China’s presence in the Middle East is not strictly limited to economic partnerships. In 2023, China brokered a Saudi-Iran rapprochement agreement, and with current instability, their shuttle diplomacy and dialogue with other ministers of foreign affairs instil in them a mature and neutral power on the international stage. These efforts are reflected in their position in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where they have called for an immediate ceasefire, end of hostilities, dialogue and negotiations. China has also flagged the unilateral actions of the US and Israel as violations of the UN Charter and international law, urging the international community to protect world order. These actions are only made stronger by the current unpredictability of the current US Administration. With so much uncertainty, other countries will be looking to diversify their allies in search of more stability.

This positioning did not emerge from the war itself; by 2026 many Arab states had already normalised ties with Iran, including the UAE and as mentioned above, Saudi Arabia. Gulf leaders saw a weakened but stable Iran as ideal. When the US and Israel struck Iran, the GCC’s response was telling: states publicly and privately opposed the attack and denied the US access to their airspace, with Saudi Arabia as a partial exception.

It is important to note the strategic nature of China’s creeping influence. China is not trying to replicate the US’ security role. Chinese policy experts broadly oppose military commitments in the Middle East, and even arms sales are limited to gaps the US will not fill such as Saudi long-range ballistic missiles. These policies are a clear indication that China has learned from the experience of the US.

These economic partnerships are not without consequence. With the Iran war erupting in February, countries around the world have been suffering the consequences of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. China retains the biggest strategic oil reserve in the world, sitting at roughly 1.3 billion barrels (roughly three times the second-highest reserve held by the US), this buffer would only last them about 4 months. China imports 80-90% of Iran’s oil exports at a discounted rate due to a recent 25-year, $400 billion deal, but this oil only makes up about 13% of their total crude imports. However, since 2022 Russia has been their largest supplier and the oil still flows through pipelines. While this will not offset losses, China has managed to largely insulate itself from the economic shocks of the war and has only mildly suffered compared to others.

With Washington focused on Iran, China has remained on the sideline, gaining soft power and information. In tandem with the Ukraine War, this conflict has given the world a look at contemporary warfare with the addition of drones. US weapons systems, missile and air defence performance, strike patterns, and defence-inventory shortages will prove valuable for military analysts in China, given their limited real-world experience. The closure of Hormuz also offers a potential preview for a Malacca Strait conflict. Furthermore, China has developed an image as a mature, neutral power via their diplomacy, UNSC ceasefire calls, and their angle as an economic and development partner instead of a military one. This makes them an attractive partner for countries looking to diversify allegiances for a more reliable, secure position.

Amid the energy crisis and peaking global warming concern, China’s dominance in solar, wind turbine, and battery manufacturing (80%+ of global) becomes a strong opportunity as nations look to diversify off of fossil fuels. In March, solar, lithium-battery, and EV exports hit record highs ($21.9B), and continue to rise. Moreover, China has leverage over the US in rare earth reserves. The US is estimated to have only ~2 months of rare earth reserves because of war-driven weapons’ use, but 71% of these resources were imported from China between 2021–2024 which may give them some leverage.  Other trade routes are blossoming as states push towards diversification. The Middle Corridor or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (via Azerbaijan and Armenia) has earned optimism with Pashinyan’s recent victory in Armenia alongside a deal with the US as contractors. This project will let Europe, the US, and China minimise the downstream risks associated to the Russian and Iran conflicts while reducing dependence on maritime routes threatened by volatile chokepoints and conflicts.

China’s strategy is not ironclad. Should the war continue and the US strategy evolve to include  regime change – seizing Iranian assets – and imposing a regime that is more pro-Western; China risks losing its decades’-long position in the country and region. Compounding this, is the fact that the GCC is not in the same place as it once was. While the war has shown incredible resilience, the GCC has become a much stronger international actor which hedges its alliances and develops its own strategic culture. So, the Gulf states will not likely pick sides. The “crossover point” that Washington has feared for decades now, where economic dependence turns into a Chinese security role, is less a real threat than first thought as China is not interested in inheriting the burdens of regional security—a restraint that makes its economic model durable. Even Washington’s chip diplomacy through NVIDIA, its clearest attempt to box China out, ran into structural limits: the US simply cannot match China’s manufacturing scale or pricing, and its own crackdowns on immigration and research erode the innovation edge it still holds. What the war shows is accelerated trends that are already in motion; Gulf hedging and confusion of US reliability rather than forcing anyone toward a new alignment. The more acute risk for China may not even be in the Gulf at all. If a prolonged US-Iran entanglement pulls Washington’s attention away from Asia, China’s real prize, Taiwan, may come back into view.

The Iran war has not handed China the Middle East, it has revealed the extent of patience and economic leverage they already had. The US spent its hegemony on costly war, while China gained quietly in the periphery.