Five weeks ago, the world was stunned by the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, offering millions of Syrians — at home and abroad — a renewed sense of hope. However, as neighbouring countries scramble for fresh alliances and global powers angle for influence, the real challenge lies ahead: forging a stable post-Assad order. Overthrowing the regime was monumental achievement, but ensuring a smooth transition may prove even more difficult. If managed correctly, Syria could finally rebuild on stronger, more inclusive foundations; if mishandled, it risks sliding back into instability.
Forging a State: The Challenges Ahead
The new leadership inherits a nation battered by years of war, marked by political fragmentation and economic free-fall. Mending the social fabric— torn by deep-seated ethnic, religious, and political divisions — is at the forefront of its challenges. Healing these rifts will take more than promises of reform; it requires addressing longstanding grievances, fostering inclusive governance, and rebuilding trust from the ground up.
In the long term, one promising avenue for navigating Syria’s deep divisions is a decentralised system of governance, one that shifts meaningful authority from the central government to local or regional bodies. Decentralisation can address years of neglect, marginalisation, and mistrust by giving each community a direct voice in its own affairs. A single “strong hand” approach may look tempting to rebuild state authority, but it’s that same model of centralised control that contributed to the civil war in the first place. By empowering local councils, decentralisation can replace top-down edicts with grassroots accountability, fostering a more sustainable and inclusive governance structure.
Moreover, Syria’s political divisions are more complicated than a simple dichotomy between pro- and anti-regime forces. After years of war, the landscape now encompasses various rebel factions, remnants of the old regime’s bureaucracy, newly formed transitional bodies, and an array of extremist elements. A notable example of this complexity is the “top-down” deradicalisation effort led by figures like Al-Sharaa — once affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra — who now advocates for a relatively more inclusive political process. However, this shift has alienated some of his former hardline supporters, while others outside his camp remain skeptical. Not everyone fully trusts his transformation from a radical jihadist to a suit-wearing “revolutionary.”
Compounding these political tensions are a shattered infrastructure and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Millions remain displaced, with refugee camps overcrowded and vital services (hospitals, schools, utilities, etc) struggling to function. The new leadership faces the dual test of urgent relief efforts and long-term economic reforms. Failure to do so could spark fresh instability, while a successful approach may pave the way for genuine national healing.
Recalibrating Regional and Global Ties
With Assad gone, Russia and Iran, the two pillars of his regime’s survival, now face a drastically reduced role in Syria. Russia had anchored its Middle East strategy around access to Syrian ports and airbases, but those assets hang in the balance as the new leadership reassesses past defence arrangements. Iran has lost even more: Assad’s Syria was a vital link in Tehran’s land corridor to the Mediterranean, enabling it to arm and coordinate with regional proxies like Hezbollah. The reshuffling of Syria’s external relationships could also open space for regional and Western actors who previously found no common ground with Assad.
Syria’s new leadership now has the opportunity to reset its relations with Western powers—particularly the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Both have a vested interest in stabilising Syria, whether through funding reconstruction projects, supporting the return of refugees, or bolstering counterterrorism efforts. This opens doors for greater economic cooperation, including investment in infrastructure, energy, and technology, which could jump-start local industries and provide much-needed jobs. Western governments, for their part, may condition this support on improvements in human rights, transparency, and governance, potentially ushering in reforms that were unthinkable under the previous regime.
Meanwhile, neighbouring countries are recalibrating their own strategies. Lebanon’s relationship with Assad was marred by decades of heavy-handed Syrian involvement in its internal affairs—ranging from military occupation to political assassinations and direct interference in Lebanese governance. For Lebanon’s political factions that long opposed Syrian dominance, this change offers a chance to reorient their alliances and possibly reduce Tehran’s regional influence. Jordan also sees an opportunity to restore trade corridors and boost border security. Nonetheless, both nations must tread carefully, as any instability in Damascus could again spill across their borders.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries also see fresh opportunities to shape Syria’s political and economic recovery. The first three countries visited by Syria’s new foreign minister were all GCC members. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which pivoted toward diplomatic engagement with Assad in his final years, are recalibrating their approach, hoping to invest in infrastructure projects and secure strategic footholds in post-war Syria. Saudi Foreign Minister stressed the importance of lifting sanctions imposed on Syria. Nonetheless, they remain cautious and skeptical of the rebels’ aims and wary of the chaos regime change and radicalism can unleash. Qatar, which backed certain rebel factions, aims to translate its political support into deeper partnerships with the emerging government, positioning itself as both an investor and mediator. Kuwait and Oman continue their more measured roles—focusing on humanitarian aid and brokering dialogues. And, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighted, in a press conference in Damascus, Syria’s commitment to representation in Arab institutions, including the Arab League.
Despite their differences, the GCC states share a key objective: to prevent a security vacuum that could reignite conflict or invite renewed Iranian infiltration. By leveraging their financial clout and political networks, the GCC states are poised to play a pivotal part in shaping Syria’s next chapter—provided they can coordinate their efforts and avoid stoking new rivalries on Syrian soil.
Despite the seismic shift that toppled Assad, and the profound regional consequences, there is still no clear vision or roadmap for Syria’s future. Political transitions, by nature, are fraught with uncertainty and the momentum that dismantled the old system does not guarantee the establishment of a stable new one. Rebuilding Syria’s institutions, ensuring genuine political and social inclusion, and preventing a return to either authoritarianism or chaos will require sustained effort, a clear strategy, and careful balancing of interests within and beyond Syria’s borders. This balancing act involves not only stakeholders within Syria but also the broader regional and international powers whose influence will shape the outcome of the transition.