Donald Trump’s electoral victory caught long-term US allies in the Gulf by surprise. Most Gulf Cooperaton Council (GCC) leaders had expected a Hillary Clinton presidency. Former First Lady, Senator and later Secretary of State, Clinton has long-standing relations with the GCC leaders and would have represented a more comfortable return to America’s foreign policy orthodoxy—albeit with Obama doctrine residue. Trump represents the unknown; a wild card, which does not appeal to the conservative statesmen engaged in restoring regional stability—like those of the Arabian Gulf.
Historically, Saudis viewed Republican administrations as being more supportive (than Democrats) of the Kingdom’s unique economic and strategic position and vulnerabilities. Such sentiment does not seem to bleed to Trump. His Islamophobia has cast him – in Saudi Arabia’s (among others’) media – as a divisive figure out to exploit the fears and insecurities of Americans. His populism fits well into the framework of a growing anti-Saudi sentiment in US public opinion. Trump might very well support the full implementation of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)—the bill allowing families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to sue foreign governments for supporting Al Qa’ida, despite it being a clear breach of international norms.
It seems likely that Trump’s America would be even more reluctant in accepting responsibilities for the maintenance of the global security architecture. Trump has underlined that he deems unfair that the US would be in charge for other, distant, countries’ security unless these countries would be ready to bear the financial burdens. As much as this idea of isolationism is dreaded by GCC elites, it can be seen as an opportunity by nationalist, interventionalist forces in the region that believe they have the chance to be more assertive without US restraints. Moreover, a Trump administration is expected to interfere very little in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries. Trump also declared he will fight against terrorism, through air campaigns, and in coordination with Russia, leading to the fear the – under a Trump presidency – Russia will have significantly more geopolitical room to further its influence and interests in the Middle East, possibly tipping the balance in Syria in favour of Bashar al-Assad.
Trump has also dedicated considerable space of his campaign rhetoric to slash the nuclear deal signed by President Barack Obama and representatives from Russia, China, the European Union, France and the United Kingdom with Iran. In theory, the prospect of re-negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran in tougher terms might be very appealing to GCC leaders. In practice it seems highly unlikely that an international deal, signed by the main world powers and sanctioned by the UN, could be thoroughly re-discussed. It does seem likely, however, that Trump, as President, would support new sanctions on Iran, that can be implemented even outside the framework of the nuclear deal. This could weaken Iran’s economic clout and deny the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) resources for destabilising the Middle East. At the same time, should these sanctions not be directed specifically against IRGC activities, they could miss these basic key purposes and backfire.
While no polls have been conducted to gauge how Saudis feel about a Trump presidency, dozens of newspaper headlines and, by now, thousands of Twitter comments suggest that it is not one that most Saudis welcome. Saudi media covered the emotionally charged atmosphere that has characterised many of Trump’s rallies as well as some of the violent incidents that have taken place between his supporters and detractors and there is much concern over the impact his presidency will have.
Trump’s reluctance – or inability – to speak about US-GCC relations in any detail makes it difficult to predict whether he will seek to strengthen relations with the GCC or not. Most regional leaders remain confident that other American institutions, and in particular the security organs, would retain some deal of influence over policy-making and in general the country’s external relations that could buffer any sudden, potentially damaging, shift. However, the bottom line, is that the outcome of the 2016 elections opened up a period of prolonged instability, uncertainty and challenges at the global level. The GCC is not immune.