The recent visit of President Donald Trump to the Arabian Gulf drew significant attention from the international media and reignited debates surrounding the direction of the regional geopolitical order—with ramifications on the wider Middle East and, indeed, Europe. Although many of the agreements signed were related to trade, they also generate substantial geopolitical impacts.

During his first term (2017), on his visit to Riyadh, Trump announced what was then considered the largest arms deal in history, with around USD 110 billion in immediate sales, covering tanks, naval vessels, missile defence systems, radar technologies and cyber security technologies.(1) Eight years later, Trump announced a new ‘largest sales agreement’ with Saudi Arabia, now valued at USD 142 billion, including air defence and border security equipment.(2) Beyond the numbers, the consistent US-Saudi engagement reinforces their strategic alignment—an essential step towards securing vital US regional interests especially in a context where Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have adopted diversified and pragmatic diplomatic approaches—seeking to play an arbitration role and preserving a non-restrictive approach to alliance.(3) Indeed, the GCC members have assumed a more active role in defining their own geopolitical agendas, moving beyond the auxiliary role of recipients of the US power umbrella. 

Trump’s subsequent visit to Qatar and the UAE further consolidated defence and commercial cooperation agreements at a time when the GCC, in general, is deepening ties with some of the more prolific emerging powers, demonstrating a clear desire for strategic autonomy.(4) Behind these billion-dollar contracts lies a US attempt to uphold traditional security guarantees while also expanding technological partnerships amid a regional environment marked by persistent tensions. 

During the same trip, Trump announced his intention to lift long-standing sanctions on Syria. Although the removal of these embargoes is, for now, a political signal, its realisation will depend on a complex process involving multilateral negotiations and the endorsement of both national and international institutions.(5) This move should be understood in a broader context of strategic reconfiguration on the regional level. The rhetoric supporting this potential easing of restrictions reflects an agenda focused on the country’s reconstruction—a process led by the Gulf states. This dynamic not only mirrors recent rapprochements between regional actors and Syria but also underscores the political calculations and economic interests driving this new arrangement. Add the fact that there is a significant diaspora of skilled professionals who fled the war and are yet to return (if they ever do). This ‘brain drain’ has weakened Syria’s national capacity and made external investment in strategic sectors, such as energy and infrastructure an imperative.(6) Furthermore, this economic reopening also carries the implicit aim of countering the remnants of Iran’s influence in Syria and operates as a geo-strategic counterweight, backed by alliances with the Gulf states and covered by the US security umbrella.

Although the effects of this reconfiguration are only expected to materialise in the medium to long term, the signal rekindled interest from multinational companies such as Total, Shell, and Suncor, which had suspended operations in the region in 2011/12. The resumption of such investments could drive Syria’s infrastructure reconstruction and strengthen economic ties to Europe and the Middle East.(7)

From a broader geopolitical perspective, these developments are likely to produce significant impacts for Europe. Stabilising Syria may lead to the gradual return of portions of Syrian refugees displaced during the civil war. This may ease socio-political pressures in Europe, which is having a hard time coping with the volume of refugees it currently faces. And, theoretically, there seems to be an emergence of a new regional order defined, in part, by soft power projections of the Gulf states. This is helping to reset priorities and may lead to a reforming of exogenous roles in the Middle East which could reshape Europe’s role as a strategic actor in the region.

There is also an observable deepening of EU-GCC relations, particularly in the energy and trade sectors. Agreements signed during the Trump administration indicate that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar represent promising markets for the acquisition of technological and defence-related products and services — areas in which Europe holds considerable expertise. In this sense, the visit also signalled potential for European multinational companies to expand their presence and engage more actively in the region. This transformation could reposition Europe as a preferred commercial partner — especially in light of the India-Middle East-Europe-Corridor (IMEC) — focused on economic cooperation. The question remains as to whether Europe will be able to transform this new regional architecture into a concrete opportunity for strategic repositioning, if the US will remain the geo-economic and geo-strategic anchor of if newcomers like China and India will completely overhaul the strategic dynamics in the region and beyond.