President Donald Trump’s first days back in the White House has already hit a strong note for US policy in the Middle East. Trump has adopted a distinctly more pro-Israel posture than his predecessor, turned up the pressure on Iran and sought to strengthen bilateral relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Trump’s appointments of those with pro-Israeli positions, such as Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Mike Huckabee as US Ambassador to Israel, demonstrate a clear pivot. Rubio had previously been a vocal opponent of ceasefires in the war on Gaza, arguing that Hamas needs to be destroyed, and Huckabee has been a lifelong proponent of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. While the ceasefire deal concluded in the final days of Biden Administration between Israel and Hamas render Rubio’s previous position moot, the Trump Administration’s preparedness to endorse Israeli territorial expansion in the West Bank runs the risk of further escalating tensions. Within hours of taking office Trump rescinded Biden’s Executive Order 14115 (1 February 2024) that saw sanctions imposed ‘[…] Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank.’¹ The the Executive order entitled ‘Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions’ (20 January 2025)² marks a major policy reversal and opens the doors for Americans to once again deal with Israeli settlers and entities associated with them.

Furthermore, while Trump reasserted his continued support for the ceasefire deal in the face of simmering tensions in the region, he has conditioned this with a lack of certainty for its endurance and offered no assurance that hostilities may not start anew.

The return of Trump has revived speculation of possible US maximum pressure strategy  against Iran, aimed at its nuclear programme also remains a possibility. Trump remained highly critical of sanctions relief towards to the Islamic Republic during the Biden Administration, reinforced by his claims of Iranian involvement behind numerous assassination plots against him. While some Iran-hawks in his Administration and Trump himself have left open the possibility of military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the immediate strategy appears to consider the sanctions route to weaken the Iranian regime to the negotiating table. The White House has also adopted a robust stance also against Iran’s proxies like the Houthis. Just two days into his second term, President Trump signed an Executive Order designating, once again, the Houthis as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ per section 219 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1189) (22 January 2025).³

Nonetheless, while the Trump Administration has adopted a tougher posture against Iran, it also apparent it is keeping the possibility for diplomatic channels open. The likelihood of the President’s utilisation of his newly appointed Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, for issues relating to Iran underscores an openness in this regard. Witkoff was a key player for the then President-elect in his negotiation efforts for a ceasefire and hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas.

Trump’s policies may also coincide with interests of some Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. His Administration’s energy policy, focused on fossil fuels, could strengthen economic relationships with these oil-producing states and further cement their position as vital US partners. The Saudi Crown Prince Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s indication he is willing to see Saudi Arabia invest $600 billion USD in the US is further evidence of deepening economic ties.

Defence and security cooperation will also continue to lie at the heart of US-Gulf relations. The Trump Administration has demonstrated a commitment to maintaining military cooperation in the region. The US’s military presence in the region, including the bases for Central Command in Qatar and the Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, will remain bolstered to deter any threats in the region.

While still early into his term, a significant known unknown remains the internal divides between a number of officials in his Administration with competing ideological backgrounds. The factions of hardliners and hawks on one side, and quasi-isolationist “America First” on the other, leaving questions as to the true foreign policy goals for this White House over the next four years. 

Trump has shown a willingness to resume many elements of his previous Middle East playbook in his first days back in office: unflinching support for Israel, economic cooperation with the Arab Gulf, and pressure on Iran. While his administration is likely to focus on strengthening partnerships with allies in the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and internal ideological friction points on policy will be crucial in determining US influence in the region.