May/June 2024 Published on April 23, 2024
Article Reviewed by Samuele Valensise
Elizabeth Economy deeply examined one of the most pressing issues in the 21st Century: the basis on which China wants to build a new international order. In particular, the author highlights why the Dragon’s order may seem appealing for many countries, especially for what is the so-called “Global South,” what are the instruments and the philosophy that Beijing is using. Economy assesses also if the strategy is actually succeeding and what should be the reaction of the US to maintain its status.
China is currently using at its advantage the sentiment of dissatisfaction from many countries, especially from the Global South, towards the current international order. In particular, many are unhappy with the attitude of the US and in general of Western countries as they see them interfering in their internal politics. In addition, the dollarised international monetary system is an evident disadvantage for several countries. Economy quotes Lula who wonders why they have to pay their transactions in dollars.
The author continues by highlighting how China is implementing its vision through a set of initiatives: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These initiatives have obtained quite a large consensus, especially at the beginning (just think that the BRI entouches 150 countries). They are aimed at providing economic development to member countries consistently with China’s economic expansion. All these policies are based on the “non-interference” approach, so Beijing supplies funds without asking for internal substantial reforms that may be not welcomed. This rhetoric is of course appealing to the long list of autocracies in the International community, but also to Global South’s democracies, and, in some cases, also to big long-standing democracies. In addition, when it comes to security and so to GSI, China adopts the same philosophy by specifying, however, that national security must be foreseen as long as it is not achieved at the expense of the others. The author outlines how this was the basis for the justification of the War in Ukraine. Then, Beijing is boosting its diplomatic relations as an alternative to military intervention and China retains the record of embassies and diplomatic offices around the World.
Whether the efforts to shape the new global order are working is still an open question for the author. When it comes to popular support in third countries, Chinese support is still quite low, also in comparison with the US, even if in the Global South the rate is higher than the average. On the economic side, the BRI was widely appreciated at the global level at the beginning, but nowadays the support for the Initiative has significantly declined. From a diplomatic point of view, China did not succeed in the role of mediator in the crisis in Israel/Palestine and Russia/Ukraine, even though its effort at the UN in preventing condemnations for its domestic affairs.
After analysing Chinese policy, the author suggests the US an approach to deal with this situation. In particular, Washington should be deeply aware of why so many countries are dissatisfied with the current international legal order. The US should promote a system change of the global order in order to meet the needs of the countries which were left behind. Washington should also be the leader in innovation and competitiveness worldwide, by prompting investments through accountability, rule of law and transparency. The author also believes that, from a defence perspective, the US should focus on competitiveness based on innovation and that Washington should apply a distinct short-term policy when it comes to confrontation with China.
Economy’s analysis is an optimum one especially as she describes the dissatisfaction of more vulnerable countries to the current international order, which have failed, for example, in providing a comprehensive and homogeneous vaccine distribution during the 2020 Covid pandemic as well as it did not enhance food security during the Russian-Ukrainian War. These are just the two most recent examples. The analysis lies on the path that we have been perceiving since the end of the Cold War. The old global order collapsed and we are still in a settling phase in which we do not have two or more clear alternatives as it was 40 years ago. This is a period when several contradictions are coming out and non-western local governments seem to have no trust in the current international legal order as they consider it based on just Western values. This is particularly evident when it comes to requests for internal reform when it comes to receiving foreign aid from western economies or western-based international economic institutions.
What makes Chinese foreign aid and investments so appealing is the non-interference approach adopted by the Chinese government, which doesn’t ask for substantial internal reform. In order to regain consensus among vulnerable countries, the US should maintain, should balance the quest for transparency and accountability with a sort of non-interference philosophy to respect the domestic political stances. If Washington’s intention is to maintain its alliances, they must invest in foreign aid not by just increasing the funds, but also by taking the lead in coordination especially during crises. The US could have managed its vaccination policy in a different way so that many countries did not have to rely on Chinese supplies. In doing so, the US can rely on their technological advantage which is still there to promote their role as an Innovative Power.
Economy’s suggestion that the US promote a comprehensive reform of the International legal order is also important. In particular, the dissatisfaction with the current structure of key international organisations—notably the UN, where the Security Council no longer represents the balance of power of the current global landscape. Then, the US could lead the reformation of more sectorial IOs, like the World Health Order, in order to improve their effectiveness during a crisis. Also the IMF and the World bank need to be reformed, in order to give less painful loans to countries passing through a budget crisis, otherwise they will increasingly look at Chinese-sponsored financial institutions.
Given these considerations, optimism is in short supply when thinking about US leadership in this. The Trump Administration’s intention is to substantially cut foreign aid. This will lead former beneficiaries to look at other countries that could supply them with more funds. Then, the US seems to have a more of a destructive rather than reformist approach when it comes to IOs as they have recently withdrawn from the WHO and the Paris’ Agreements. This could paradoxically be an occasion for China as it could promote itself as a coordination power within the organisations left by the US. And the approach towards the Chinese Government is one of the most looming questions about the current Administration: will Trump apply a short term approach as suggested by Economy, or will the China Hawks prevail?