When Iran commenced with Operation True Promise (va’de-ye sadeq) — which entailed the launching of some 320 airborne ordinances (drones, ballistic and cruise missiles) towards Israel (13/14 April 2024) — there is no doubt that it sought to score a symbolic, rather than a strategic, win. Putting Tehran’s operation in context, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite military structure upholding the Islamic Republic, was not trying to punish Tel Aviv for the war in Gaza, but for Israel’s own strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed two IRGC generals on 1 April. Demonstrating a ‘price’ for Israel’s operations against Iran’s personnel, militias, proxies and interests, Tehran had sought to contain Israel rather than open another front.

The geopolitics of the Middle East is now in a state of flux, the dust is yet to settle and the implications are yet to be deciphered. However, three geopolitical subregions of the Middle East — the Gulf and Jordan, Iraqi Kurdistan and the East Mediterranean — are raising eyebrows for their increasing centricity in the unfolding process of reshaping the Middle East. Three key points stand out:

1. Strategic interests trump all—the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), together with Jordan, may be at odds with Israel — especially the Netanyahu clique — in relation to its disproportionate operations against the Palestinian people but this does not equate to a carte blanc for Iran (or its many militias, including the Houthis in Yemen) to use their airspace or sea lanes to strike at Israel. If Tehran thought it would become the vanguard of Islamic power by attacking Israel, the Arab states had different ideas—and this has little to do with Israel but rather with the protection of their own national sovereignty and security. Neither the GCC states nor Jordan have an interest in becoming an air route for Iranian or Israeli attacks and defend their skies as they do their land.
2. Trade routes need protection—while Bahrain may be the only regional actor to have joined in the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to end Houthi harassment and seizure of international shipping vessels, it is increasingly clear that a more robust regional and international coalition is needed to secure the sea lines of communications, keep the key geopolitical chokepoints open (the Straits of Hormuz and Mandeb) and preserve the integrity of international treaties that pledge unimpeded use of international waters. Since the war in Gaza began (October 2023) fears are mounting that a real disruption of trade is likely, Iran’s attempt to violate the airspaces of several countries underscores the need for a new treaty, one that also includes the protection of strategic air corridors.
3. Multipolarity—is emerging much faster than anticipated, leaving a massive vacuum open that many are trying to fill. To be sure, the United States continues to be, by far, the foremost global power and its projection into the Middle East is second to none. But assets are not everything. The US no longer has the political appetite to police the Med-Red and Arabian seas or the Gulf. Instead, it is increasingly looking for its allies to absorb more of the burden of maintaining stability. This is against the backdrop of a network of allies unsure of their power and even more unsure about how to use it. Iran certainly will continue to try and upend the tentative balance of power in the region — with the help of its allies in Moscow — and if the last was only a dry-run of Iranian operations against Israel (and potentially against some of the GCC states—it has a longterm rivalry with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) it may be in the interest to prolong US regional hegemony…at least in the interim.

****

While much speculation continues to surround the war in Gaza (including the future of a Palestinian state based on the two state solution) and the enduring rivalry between Tel-Aviv and Tehran, it is clear that instability in the region benefits few and hurts many. A comprehensive approach is now required in order to stabilise the region, protect the trade routes and ensure that the scourge of violence ends.