A stronger partnership between the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could enhance the EU’s energy security and help to achieve its green transition goals. The potential of this cooperation however extends beyond the traditional supply of hydrocarbons or clean energy, such as hydrogen, and mutually beneficial collaboration could help both blocs to enhance their economic security and positions internationally.

Facing increased geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, the EU is looking for ways to adapt and is reevaluating trade partnerships with third countries to boost its economic security and shield itself from the impact of growing conflict and fragmentation on the progress of its energy and digital transitions as well as the development of the increasingly important defence and space sectors. A core issue it seeks to address is the stability and diversity of supply chains of the materials that are key for the EU economy but prone to high supply risks of exploitation and disruption. Wary of the catastrophic economic impact of the global pandemic and the over-reliance on Russia for energy supplies the EU is focusing on preventing a similar scenario when it comes to critical raw materials where it is largely dependent on China (heavy rare earth elements), but also Turkey (boron, antimony, feldspar), South Africa (platinum), Chile (lithium) and Brazil (niobium). However, limiting dependence on any single supplier and strengthening global supply chains will require the EU to forge more reliable partnerships around the world. In line with the so-called Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness, which states that ‘the EU will need to develop a genuine “foreign economic policy” that coordinates preferential trade agreements and direct investment with resource-rich nations, the building up of stockpiles in selected critical areas, and the creation of industrial partnerships to secure the supply chain of key technologies,’ the EU will intensify its focus on Africa, Central Asia, South America and the Gulf region.

The cooperation opportunities highlighted at the EU-GCC Summit mirrored some recommendations of the Draghi Report and signalled the EU’s growing emphasis on its economic power and interests in its foreign relations. The final statement featured prominently EU-GCC cooperation in innovation and diversifying and securing supply chains for clean technologies, raw materials and critical minerals necessary for the energy transition, which could also benefit from the renewed, yet uneasy, talks on a Free Trade Agreement between the two blocs or possible preferential trade agreements related to clean technologies and critical raw materials. It also comes ahead of the planned launch of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in January 2026, the carbon tariff that will impact also imports from the GCC.

The EU’s goal to reduce dependencies on a single supplier of raw materials and diversify sources aligns with the GCC countries’ efforts to reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons and diversify their economies. Many of the Gulf countries, particularly Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have been focusing on investing in mining and processing industries both domestically and internationally, notably in Africa and South America, to entrench themselves in the global supply chains of the future, to boost their position globally and to secure the necessary materials for domestic purposes. Oman and Saudi Arabia have even made mining industry a core pillar of their national economic diversification plans. Moreover, through domestic and foreign investments, the GCC countries are working to secure the supply chain of critical materials from mining, production, and processing to transportation. They are developing intra-regional transportation infrastructure, such as the railway system, for transporting mined products to processing and manufacturing factories, and securing access to strategic ports and hubs around the world. There have also been investments in processing and manufacturing facilities in the Gulf to boost the economic benefits for local populations, including job creation. Through these efforts the GCC countries aim to become leaders in clean energy and technologies, including electric vehicles, batteries and hydrogen, and digital technologies, including Artificial Intelligence, and support the localisation of the defence industry production — all sectors that require securing critical raw materials. The region’s strategic position between Europe, Africa and Asia will contribute to its role as a hub in the global supply chains of critical raw materials and securing clean energy and technologies, including for Europe.

The GCC countries possess reserves of several of the 34 critical raw materials identified in the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, including aluminium, manganese, copper, feldspar, baryte, helium, phosphate rock, magnesite and antimony, and there are ongoing efforts to map and develop new deposits as well as invest in their production abroad. The UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are among the world’s top 10 producers of aluminium. Bahrain itself accounts for over 2% of the world’s aluminium production and is home to the world’s largest aluminium smelter outside of China. Saudi Arabia also possesses significant deposits of the associated bauxite, which is key for producing aluminium, while the UAE has invested in the bauxite sector abroad, notably in Guinea. Aluminium is a key component in many clean technologies necessary for the energy transition and tops the EU’s list of 34 critical raw materials. Oman and Saudi Arabia are also thought to be rich with another critical metal — copper — and Muscat plans to also begin large-scale copper mining. According to its estimates, the EU’s demand for aluminium and copper is expected to multiply three and five times respectively by 2030, and five times and nine times respectively by 2050. Beyond aluminium and copper, Oman is the world’s largest exporter of gypsum, a key producer of chromium, antimony and manganese and was the first GCC country to produce and export ferrochrome. Saudi Arabia is the world’s 7th largest producer of phosphate rock, 8th primary producer of magnesite, and a notable producer of feldspar and baryte and is working on extracting lithium from seawater and brine. The Kingdom doubled the value of its estimated reserves of critical minerals from $1.3 trillion in 2016 to $2.5 trillion in early 2024 and has allocated billions for projects abroad, with a focus on copper, lithium, iron ore and nickel. Qatar is the world’s 2nd refinery producer of helium gas after the US, accounting for 37.1% of the world’s production. Doha is also investing in critical materials projects through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority.

The two-way direct trade in critical materials between the EU and the GCC remains limited, with one notable exception — Qatar is a key supplier of EU’s helium, accounting for nearly 22% in 2023. Also the UAE supply of manganese to the EU grew to 10% in 2023. Beyond that, in 2023 the EU imported 4% of aluminium from the UAE, 3% from Bahrain and 1% from Saudi Arabia, slightly less than in 2018, whereas imports from Turkey grew almost by 11%. Nearly 2% of EU’s antimony imports came from Oman, while 3% of EU’s exports went to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia supplied around 2% of magnesite to the EU, while the EU increased its exports of magnesite to the UAE to nearly 2.3%.

Given that the deposits of minerals and metals on the Arabian Peninsula are still largely unexplored, attracting investments and partners with expertise to help develop the industry has become a key task of Gulf authorities. Amid intensifying competition, many countries, including China, India, Japan, the UK and the US, have been exploring cooperation with GCC countries on securing critical raw materials either in the Gulf or abroad. Partnership with Gulf countries could help facilitate EU’s access to markets in regions where it lacks influence and help develop local infrastructure, such as in Africa. Supporting the development of the GCC countries’ capabilities in producing and processing critical raw materials could also increase global competition and widen the pool of key players in the market that are more strategically aligned with the EU, while weakening the control of the current few, such as China and Russia. For example, in Africa, the GCC countries have been emerging as competitors to Beijing, although they have to balance their approach given China’s importance as the GCC’s main trading partner and importer of oil. The Gulf countries can be expected to continue to develop partnerships with China and Russia on the one hand and the US and Europe on the other hand — as long as it is economically beneficial.

The GCC countries’ increasingly important role in the global mining industry and securing critical materials supply chains will help position them as key players in the wider geoeconomic competition in the coming years. Building on the positive political momentum in inter-regional relations and overlapping strategic interests, forming mutually beneficial partnerships between the EU and the GCC countries could help support the GCC countries’ economic diversification efforts and fulfil the EU’s energy and digital transition ambitions, while potentially weakening the dominance of its competitors and adversaries. Going forward, the GCC countries are well positioned to play an important role in the EU’s economic strategy for the new changing era.