As Hungary enters its final month of its six-month presidency rotational Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) (1 July to 31 December 2024), tensions between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and EU institutions have shaped much of its term. The Presidency thrust the bloc’s longest currently serving head of government, to a pivotal position in EU leadership, at least on the intergovernmental level. Nevertheless, the extent to which Orbán has utilised this opportunity to try and shape the EU’s legislative agenda in his “Make Europe Great Again” vision, guide ministerial discussions, serve as the face of the Council of EU, or even pursue Hungary’s national interests, is debatable.
Orbán has consistently clashed with the European Commission over rule-of-law issues and policies related to migration and Ukraine. These disputes have led to scepticism among other EU Member States and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) regarding Hungary’s ability to lead impartially. Some have even debated over the merits of potentially suspending the Presidency altogether. Despite these concerns, Hungary retained its leadership role, but its Presidency has often been viewed as highly political rather than procedural or policy-driven. The political nature of his agenda has been evident in Orbán’s criticism of the outgoing first term Von der Leyen Commission and his promotion of a vision for the EU as a primarily intergovernmental organisation. His approach has in part contributed to Hungary’s alienation in the European-bloc, with Orbán’s government frequently accused of obstructing consensus. Furthermore, the Commission continues to pursue legal action against Hungary under Article 7 of the Treaty on the EU, a process that could ultimately result in sanctions or the suspension of Hungary’s voting rights in the Council. While the Article 7 procedure has not yet led to concrete penalties, the ongoing disputes have placed a strain on Hungary’s ability to build consensus and navigate the complexities of EU governance. This strained relationship continues to hamper the institutional impact during Hungary’s presidency, with trust in its leadership, at least within the EU-bloc, remains low.
While the Hungarian Presidency has remained rocky domestically in Europe, geopolitically speaking Hungary’s presidency has had minimal direct engagement with the Arabian Gulf, but Orbán’s foreign policy focus on energy diversification and global alliances aligns with broader EU efforts to strengthen ties with Gulf states. This was underlined in their original programme statement upon taking the Presidency: “The Hungarian Presidency will support more active cooperation with the Gulf countries by implementing the Joint Communication: A Strategic Partnership with the Gulf. We will strive to enhance EU-GCC relations in the fields of security, counterterrorism, energy and green transition, people-to-people contacts, trade, and investments. The Hungarian Presidency intends to step up EU efforts to restore regional stability and the security of supply chains in the Red Sea region.”
Perhaps the hallmark achievement of the Hungarian Presidency as it relates to their prioritisation of EU-GCC relations was their hosting of the first EU-GCC Summit in Brussels on 16 October 2024. It notably secured a joint commitment to a strategic trade and investment partnership, the green and digital transitions, sustainable energy, connectivity, and economic integration and diversification of both economies, a nod to Orbán’s priority roadmap. Nonetheless, despite this, the Hungarian Prime Minister’s diplomatic overtures to non-Western powers throughout the Hungarian Presidency, including China and Russia, have adversely affected EU foreign policy coherence overall, especially considering the ongoing instability in the Middle East.
A further twist in the story of this Presidency has been seen in the election of Donald Trump to a second, non-consecutive term as US President. Orbán’s warm relationship with the President-elect, has added a complex dynamic to his relationship with his European counterparts, but also a possible opportunity. As Orbán publicly cheerled Trump’s campaign from an otherwise sceptical European political-class, his healthy rapport with the President-elect positions himself as a potential key intermediary for the incoming US administration on key issues like trade tariffs, especially during this awkward transition period.
While this Presidency has been marked by ideological friction within the EU, amplified by Orbán’s alignment with Trump and divergence from the mainstream EU geopolitical narrative, it has seen overseen sound takeaways on EU-GCC relations evidenced in the Summit. A Presidency constrained by institutional mistrust and limited consensus however, means its legacy and impact is much limited. The Hungarian rotation has offered a snapshot into the challenges in balancing national and supranational, objectives, particularly in an era of geopolitical and economic uncertainty, and growing populism both sides of the Atlantic.
Resources
European Council / Council of the EU, Hungarian Presidency programme, https://hungarian-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/programme/
European Council / Council of the EU, First European Union-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit – Joint Statement, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/16/first-european-union-gulf-cooperation-council-summit-joint-statement/