As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) celebrates its 75th anniversary, 30 years of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with seven Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and 20 years of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with four out of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), expectations are high for the 2024 Washington Summit regarding NATO’s future engagement with its Southern Neighbourhood, including the GCC. The Summit came at a turbulent time for the Western alliance amid escalation with Russia, Iran and China, and, against the backdrop of a superelection year which will culminate with US presidential elections in November and will influence the future direction of the Alliance.

The latest push towards the Southern Neighbourhood — the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel — came on the heels of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the 2023 Vilnius Summit pledge to expand and consolidate NATO’s position and influence in those regions, where a vacuum left by the West has began to be filled by its adversaries. There is a renewed hope that the war in Ukraine and the military cooperation¹ between Russia and Iran is helping to connect the dots for many Allies who tended to disregard the idea that instability in the neighbourhood was aimed at undermining NATO’s security and that such instability was contagious. It also highlighted the interconnectedness of the various crises in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods and showed that MENA partners have a role to play in addressing the war in Ukraine. Due to the geographic proximity and strategic importance for NATO, it is important to recalibrate relations with MENA and its sub-regions, such as the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf, in this period of increased fragmentation and uncertainty

NATO and the Southern Neighbourhood

The idea of enhanced relations with the Southern Neighbourhood is not new. It has been part of the debate since the 1990s. In 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, NATO reiterated its commitment to the security of the strategically important southern region and warned that should the Gulf War spread to its member Turkey, it would enact Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter, where an armed attack against one of its members is considered an attack against all. It did not expand and NATO was not forced to utilise Article 5.² Instead, the US led a coalition of more than 30 countries to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Interestingly, events in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood would eventually bring NATO to invoke Article 5 —following the 9/11 2001 attacks in the United States. This was the first and, so far, the only time that NATO has used its collective security clause.

The MD (1994) together with the ICI (2004) were NATO’s first official initiatives to formalise relations with partners in the south. Since then there have been numerous activities to support those efforts. This intensified again in 2014, following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, when NATO recognised the need for a dedicated hub
focused on the MENA and laid the groundwork for the Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples, Italy, to be opened three years later. NATO also expanded practical cooperation with southern partners, including³ through the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, which grew to include three MD members—Jordan (2014), Iraq (2015) and Mauritania (2022). The Projecting Stability concept, launched in⁴ 2016, reinforced the link between NATO’s security and its neighbourhood’s stability—with conflicts in Ukraine’s Crimea, Iraq and Syria lapping at Europe’s shores. Two years later, NATO established an advisory⁵ and capacity-building mission in Iraq upon the invitation of the Iraqi government and endorsed the Package on the South, which sought to chart a more strategic and coherent approach to MENA, with three main objectives, to: strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence against threats coming from the south, contribute to regional international crisis management, and help its partners build resilience against security threats.⁶

These guided NATO’s approach to the Middle East in general, but they required specification to address some of the more pressing strategic challenges that were unfolding. To address individual partner countries’ needs, NATO adopted the ‘One Partner, One Plan’ approach in 2021 and established the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) as an overarching framework for its cooperation with partners. Over the years, events in the Southern Neighbourhood have highlighted the need to adjust the relationship, however, at the same time, other regions such as the Indo-Pacific became more prioritised. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, NATO leaders agreed to strengthen the Alliance’s political dialogue and practical cooperation with MD and ICI partners and continue to engage with the GCC. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO vowed to deepen political engagements and public diplomacy to the MD and ICI partners and explore the possibility of establishing a NATO Liaison Office in Jordan, the first one in the region.⁷

The Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, sought to react to the changing strategic environment. It defined NATO’s key purpose of ensuring collective defence and reiterated its three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. The Alliance also stressed that Russia seeks to destabilise its southern and eastern 8 neighbourhoods and warned that Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes and that Russia, Syria and North Korea, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons. To adapt to the changing strategic environment, NATO reaffirmed that it will work with partners to tackle shared security threats in regions of strategic interest to the Alliance, including the MENA and the Sahel, reiterating that conflict, fragility and instability in those regions directly affect the security of NATO and its partners and enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors. However, despite those political declarations, it was clear that to ensure success, a new approach that would use the current tools more effectively was needed. A few months later after the Vilnius Summit, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, appointed a group of independent experts to draft a report with recommendations for recalibrating NATO’s approach to its southern neighbourhood, which was published in May 2024, and which will inform the decisions taken at the Washington Summit.9

The GCC and NATO

The NATO-ICI cooperation is based on six core principles: non-discrimination, self-differentiation, two-way engagement, non-imposition, diversity and complementarity to other international initiatives in the region. Over the years, the GCC countries have, to varying degrees, provided logistical support to NATO operations, including in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2009); both Qatar and the UAE participated in NATO’s operation in Libya in 2011; and the GCC countries contributed alongside NATO to the Global Coalition Against Daesh since 2014. Kuwait hosted the first NATO-ICI naval exercise in 2008 before NATO launched its naval Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016), which focused on anti-piracy measures in a large area stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz and all the way south to Madagascar. In 2012, the UAE became the first Arab country to open a diplomatic mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels and Kuwait was the first Gulf country to sign a transit agreement with NATO. On the 10th year anniversary of the ICI, in 2014, relations seemed to be getting more traction as the NATO-ICI held the first Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Kuwait became the first ICI country to sign the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with NATO, the NATO ICI Policy Advisory Group Meetings were
instituted and were, since then, held in Turkey (2014), Kuwait (2015), Qatar (2016), Kuwait (2018) and Bahrain (2023), the UAE became a founding member of NATO’s Interoperability Platform and, together with Bahrain, remain the only GCC members, and NATO invited the Gulf countries to join Operation Ocean Shield to boost maritime security cooperation. In 2017, NATO established its first presence in the Gulf, the¹⁰ ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait dedicated to political dialogue, education and training for NATO and ICI/GCC countries. In 2021, Bahrain appointed a NATO military attaché residing in London. Following the¹¹ Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been also a notable uptick in NATO officials’ visits to the Gulf countries. Recently, Qatar entered into talks with NATO regarding the possible establishment of a regional centre for training of NATO allies and partners.¹²

While the GCC-NATO contacts have slowly intensified since the early 2000s, so far, only the smaller GCC countries joined the ICI, with Oman and Saudi Arabia opting to stay out—although they participate in selected ICI meetings and activities. As a reflection of the efforts to intensify cooperation with non-ICI members, notably Saudi Arabia and the GCC, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, visited Riyadh in December 2023, the first Secretary General to do so. Stoltenberg stressed the potential for Saudi-NATO cooperation in areas such as maritime security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the fight against terrorism, as well as innovation and military education. The new NATO Secretary General, Mark¹³ Rutte, could continue supporting the Alliance’s commitment to its southern partners by visiting the region early in his mandate. The need for enhanced cooperation with the GCC will be further reinforced should Iran and Russia formalise their military cooperation and opt to further pressure the West and its allies.¹⁴

Due to their geographic proximity to Iran and near encirclement by its proxies, the GCC countries are looking for ways to reinforce their deterrence capabilities, supported by both political and military means. Following several years of attacks on commercial vessels in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula as well as missile and drone attacks targeting civilian areas inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the prime focus is on air defence and maritime security, protection of critical infrastructure including energy facilities and ports. These are areas where deeper collaboration between NATO and the GCC countries could prove mutually beneficial. The Russia-Iran link in Ukraine is creating synergies between NATO and the Gulf and supports the exchange of experiences and information about Russian and Iranian conduct in the Middle East and Ukraine.

Overcoming Challenges

Despite a number of efforts in recent years, NATO has lacked a clear strategy for the Middle East, which has affected its ability to shape its strategic environment. Some regional partners struggle to see the added value of cooperating with NATO, which has been often understood as an extended arm of the US, owing to the mixed record of its operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Alternatively, some overestimate what NATO can do. Being an inter-governmental, politico-military, defensive alliance, there are limits to NATO’s capabilities and certain challenges may be beyond its scope, which is where division of responsibilities with other organisations such as the European Union is crucial. NATO will have to build trust and skilfully communicate its interest in addressing mutual challenges with local actors in order to contribute to regional stability and stress NATO’s multilateral nature as an added value for regional security. At the same time, NATO members have divergent — sometimes even competing — visions for the region, most prominently regarding Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Israel and Palestine, and many of the existing bilateral military and defence arrangements between the member states of NATO and GCC compete with NATO’s offers.

Sustaining multilateral ties with the Middle East, including the GCC, has been challenging for NATO as the countries prefer bilateral engagements and their cooperation has been hindered due to episodes of internal fragmentation, such as during the 2017-2021 intra-GCC crisis. However, given the growing interconnectedness of security issues in the wider Middle East, and notably between the East Mediterranean and the Gulf, multilateral cooperation could be strengthened through issue-based collaboration involving selected actors from both the MD and the ICI.

Moving On
Despite the plethora of challenges, NATO remains a key structure for coordinating cooperation on military, security and defence issues. Although NATO does not appear to be looking to assume the role of a regional security provider, it could contribute to enhancing stability in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, while taking advantage of the established relations of its members and allies in the region, and simultaneously boosting deterrence for the organisation and its regional partners. NATO could also provide a level of continuity for the GCC countries and help limit the potential negative impact of political change in a bilateral military and defence partner country. However, rather than replacing bilateral arrangements with its member states, deepened cooperation with NATO would complement those to forge stronger collaboration. The Gulf is a crucial piece of the puzzle in NATO’s global defence and deterrence posture, just as NATO could significantly contribute to building up the GCC’s effective defence and deterrence capabilities. Enhancing engagement and mutually beneficial cooperation is in both NATO’s and the GCC countries’ interest. To that end, charting a clear strategy, investing political capital and providing adequate resources will be crucial for its success.

References

¹ NATO, ‘Vilnius Summit Communiqué’, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

² NATO, ‘Statement on the Gulf’, 17 December 1990, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23687.htm?selectedLocale=en.

³ NATO SHAPE, NATO Strategic Direction South Hub officially opens, 5 September 2017, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2017/nato-strategic-direction-south-hub-officially-opens.

⁴ NATO, ‘Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative’, 29 May 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm

⁵ Ruben Díaz-Plaja, ‘Projecting Stability: an agenda for action’, 13 March 2018, NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/03/13/projecting-stability-an-agenda-for-action/index.html

⁶ NATO, ‘Brussels Summit Declaration’, 11 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

⁷ NATO, ‘2021 NATO Summit in Brussels’, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm

⁸ NATO, ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

⁹ NATO, ‘Group of experts publishes report on NATO’s southern neighbourhood’, 7 May 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_225245.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹⁰ NATO, ‘Keynote address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the North Atlantic Council – ICI seminar celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Doha, Qatar’, 11 December 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_115900.htm?selectedLocale=fr

¹¹ NATO, ’NATO marks closer ties with Gulf partners, opens new centre in Kuwait’, 24 January 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_140308.htm.

¹² Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Qatar Participates in Joint Meeting of NAC, ICI in Brussels’, 13 September 2023, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/1445/02/28/qatar-participates-in-joint-meeting-of-nac-iciin-brussels; NATO SHAPE, ’Military Strategic Partnership Conference 2023 now looking ahead to 2024’, 23 March 2023, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2023/military-strategic-partnership-conference-2023-now-looking-aheadto-2024.

¹³ NATO, ‘Secretary General sets out vision for deeper NATO–Saudi Arabia cooperation in historic first visit to Riyadh’, 12 December 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220769.htm

¹⁴ Agnes Helou, ‘What the Russia-Iran ‘comprehensive agreement’ means for Western security interests,’ Breaking Defense, 1 July 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/what-the-russia-iran-comprehensive-agreement-means-forwestern-security-interests/.