One of the most significant geopolitical events of the first half of 2026 was the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, with the latter supported by Israel. This marked a pivotal moment for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the region’s historical balance of power. The future of Iran and the prospect of a ‘regime change’ have become the focus of academic debate on the Middle East and forces the question of the position of the GCC countries to Iranian opposition groups, particularly those of Prince Pahlavi and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).

Rather than increasing their support, the GCC countries adopted a more cautious approach. This choice was not the result of an ideological or diplomatic rapprochement, but rather an increasingly pragmatic and stability-orientated approach.

However, as Mehran Kamrava argued, relations between the Gulf countries and Iran have been characterised by concerns related to regional stability and security rather than ideological rivalry. Although the Tehran government is perceived as a threat and a rival, the GCC’s objective is not its political elimination, but rather its containment. This was evident in the attempted de-escalation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, which was mediated by China. It was precisely the repeated failure of regime change in the region — especially during the Arab Spring in Syria and Libya, and previously in Iraq — that confirmed to the Gulf countries the potential for structural instability that could jeopardise their interests and balances of power.

Reza Pahlavi: The Shah’s Heir and the Royalist Opposition

The role of Reza Pahlavi’s royalist opposition has symbolically grown within the Iranian diaspora and Western media coverage in the context of the war. His popularity stems from the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty and his pro-Western and progressive stance, and he is now widely regarded in the media as the main figure of the Iranian opposition. Nevertheless, Reza Pahlavi and his family remain a polarising figure in Iran. A survey conducted by GAMAAN (The Group for Analysing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) found that a third of the population supports him, while another third strongly rejects him.

In this context, the position of the GCC countries has remained profoundly cautious, with the region’s leaders displaying a reluctance to take any risks that could potentially disrupt the delicate balance. Despite Pahlavi’s repeated attempts to open a line of communication by condemning Iranian missile attacks and reassuring them of stable and fruitful collaboration in the event of his victory in Iran, the GCC’s response has been cold and cautious. They are intent on not publicly legitimising any kind of relationship with Reza Pahlavi. This approach adopted by the Gulf states stems not only from a strategy of containment and stability, but also from limited confidence in Pahlavi’s ability to structurally and organisationally overthrow the Islamic regime.

MEK: The Historically Compromised Opposition

The situation of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) is even more complicated. Founded in the 1960s as an anti-Shah movement, the organisation’s ideology was influenced by Marxist and leftist thought. Led at the time by Massoud Rajavi, the movement was outlawed in 1981 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, forcing its leadership and supporters into exile and persecution. However, it was not just its Marxist and revolutionary political spectrum that compromised the organisation. In the 1980s, the MEK even supported Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war against the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran. This decision was seen by some in Iranian society as compromising the organisation’s national interests for the sake of its own factional ones. Furthermore, the MEK was classified as a terrorist organisation in both the United States and the European Union for many years. It was only removed from the EU’s list of terrorist organisations in 2009 and the US State Department’s list in 2012.

Today, the MEK enjoys much greater legitimacy than in the past. In fact, it now heads the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and is the most organised opposition group. However, due to its political affiliations and compromised history, the GCC countries have been reluctant to engage in formal collaboration. As with Pahlavi, a cautious and informal approach has always been preferred with the MEK. However, during periods of heightened tension between Riyadh and Tehran, some Saudi officials have attended MEK-organised events, such as Prince Turki al-Faisal (former head of Saudi intelligence), who spoke at an event in Paris in 2016. Therefore, as with Pahlavi, relations with the MEK are highly informal and avoided, although they may have been greater in the past.

The Iranian Opposition’s Problem: Fragmentation

One of the main reasons why GCC countries refuse to collaborate formally and actively with the Iranian opposition is their fragmentation. The division between monarchists, republicans, democrats and minority movements undermines any action taken against the regime.

The strategy of the Gulf countries is to accept Iranian competition through a strategy of containment, without overthrowing the regime. This approach could lead to a period of political instability and chaos that might spread beyond Iran’s borders. It is precisely this strategic prudence, combined with the Iranian opposition’s weak cohesion, that explains why neither the MEK nor Reza Pahlavi have managed to establish formal collaboration with the GCC countries.