In February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine eclipsed concerns over the next wave of COVID-19 and refocused the European Union’s (EU) strategic priority list. Since then, a host of changes to EU foreign and security policies have unfolded including the unmooring of EU energy security from Russian gas supplies, the increase in defence spending — across the EU — and the seeking-out of new alliance partners. Starting with enhancing NATO in terms of quality of training, weapons procurements and geographic extension of the Atlantic Alliance to Finland and Sweden, both formerly neutral states, the EU has begun to reassess its global position and the alliances it develops.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) is rapidly emerging as the centrepiece of EU attention in the latter’s ever-evolving geopolitical strategic positioning. This is due to two main drivers: Geographic and Economic.

Geographically, the Arabian Peninsula, which is home to the six GCC members, is an important node connected to the Levant (and the Mediterranean), Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the north and across the shallow Gulf, sharing the Red Sea with Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea to the west and the Gulf of Oman with Pakistan. Since the EU has begun to pay more attention to geopolitics, as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, it also has started to value alignment with the GCC as platforms for projection and forward defence. If, as many now suggest, there is a new Cold War brewing, the EU’s approach to the GCC may be in anticipation of denying more nefarious actors access to the southern encroaches to the European continent. There are also crucial maritime routes that require protection. The budding India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) places the GCC as a pivot and maritime security is key, shared, priority in the Euro-Gulf space. It is not a one way street, however. The EU, NATO and individual countries from those blocs are important security providers for the GCC. This mutual security support is in the midst of a growth spurt.

In terms of economics, the GCC countries are economic giants whose natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, power the great engines of industry around the world. At the same time, three of the top five most powerful currencies in the world are located in the GCC— the Kuwaiti Dinar (1), the Bahraini Dinar (2) and the Omani Rial (3). And, each of the six GCC members have invested heavily in their economies to encourage growth and innovation while attracting the best and brightest from around the world. The Gulf’s capital cities of Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait City, Manama, Muscat and Riyadh, in addition to the dozens of other cities and hundred of towns, are not the same places as they were in the 1990’s—they are bustling metropolises generating a gestalt shift of economic activities and opportunities. The EU has begun to understand that for many of its international projects to be realised it needs financial support from the GCC while many of its citizens contribute to the growth and development of the Gulf bloc.

Against the backdrop of enhanced engagement between the EU and GCC — on the state, business and individual levels — there has been little movement to unsticking the EU-GCC free trade agreement which would enshrine trade relations and ensure a more comprehensive easing of engagements. Of course, the lack of a free trade agreement has not impacted trade volumes, which consistently grow. It also has not dented collaboration in many fields from green technology to visa liberalisation and intelligence sharing to arts, culture and educational exchanges. All in all, the EU-GCC relationship is strong and getting stronger despite lacking treaty/agreement rooted codification.

That may be about to change. The upcoming, first ever, EU-GCC Summit (16 October) will reconfigure the two blocs relationship. It will address pressing international issues and determine the road of travel for the next generation of interactions. Of course, both sides will come to the Summit with redlines and expectations. The EU will likely press the GCC to limit its relationships to Russia and China and the GCC will likely resist such pressure— citing their ongoing policy of neutrality and freedom of engage with all international actors. At the same time, the two blocs have the shared interest of ending the Israel-Palestine conflict and constructing a viable, two state solution to their enduring conflict in addition to containing Iran and pushing to reinforce the international order based on the UN Charter.

There is more that unites than divides the EU and the GCC. The international environment may be heading into a period of prolonged turbulence and crises, but the EU-GCC relationship is shaping up to be a stabilising force and an important vehicle towards bringing inter-regional peace, prosperity and security.