Four years into Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has undergone a significant transformation from a country dependent on Western military assistance into an emerging security provider, exporting its battlefield experience to partners facing similar threats. This shift became ever more apparent with sustained Iranian attacks on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since 28 February 2026, which exposed the shared security challenges as the Gulf countries confronted the very same drone and missile threats that Kyiv has spent years learning to counter. This evolving landscape has contributed to strengthening linkages between security in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood and the Black Sea, and developments in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. This may signal the emergence of a new type of security cooperation based on shared vulnerabilities and complementary capabilities, as converging threats draw together partners outside the traditional Western security frameworks. Simultaneously, through the Ukraine-GCC defence cooperation, the Gulf states are inserting themselves into European security while Europe is at the same time seeking a role in the future Gulf security architecture.

The Russia-Iran Threat Nexus

The link between the Ukrainian and Gulf theatres has become more pronounced since 2022 when Russia’s use of Iranian drones against Ukraine exposed how military cooperation between sanctioned countries could rapidly affect conflict dynamics across regions. Russia’s subsequent domestic production of altered Shahed drones further diffused low-cost air strike capabilities¹. The war in Ukraine has thus provided a real-time case study for countries concerned with Iranian military programmes and how they function on the battlefield. Simultaneously, Russian experiences in Ukraine also helped to inform Tehran’s drone tactics against the GCC countries.

The escalation following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran after 28 February, further exposed links between the two conflicts. Reports indicate that Russia supplied altered Shahed drones and provided reconnaissance and intelligence support to Iran, which was reportedly used for striking US assets in the GCC countries, while Russian-linked groups claimed cyber-attacks targeting the GCC countries’ critical infrastructure and government agencies². This was confirmed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohamed bin Salman in March 2026, in which the Ukrainian President stressed that Russia’s assistance to the Iranian regime poses ‘a threat to all.’³ Russia has also benefited economically from the Gulf crisis through higher oil and gas prices, the easing of US restrictions on its energy exports, and delays in military assistance from the US to Ukraine and European allies⁴. Additionally, Russia’s political backing of Iran at the UN Security Council, including its veto alongside China of a Bahrain-drafted resolution on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, has further affected views in the GCC⁵. The threat axis linking Russia and Iran, and uncertainty over allied Western support, has thus become a driver of realignment, pushing GCC and Ukraine toward new partners.

From Vulnerability to Capability

Ukraine’s value as a security partner stems from its rapid battlefield innovation under resource constraints and sustained military pressure. Kyiv has developed highly sought-after capabilities in air defence and emerged as a leader in (counter-)drone warfare⁶. By 2025, domestic production accounted for nearly 60% of the weapons used on the frontline in Ukraine, with drone production increasing from several thousand units in 2022 to 4 million in 2025, targeting 7 million or more in 2026.⁷ Ukraine developed layered, cost-effective and scalable solutions incorporating Western systems with domestically produced technologies, including drone interceptors and electronic warfare tools, continuously tested and refined on the battlefield in real time. Kyiv offers interceptors under 10,000 euros — including SkyFall’s P1-Sun 3D printed interceptor drone at around 1,000 euros, which was introduced at the Dubai Airshow in November 2025 — to counter drones that cost tens of thousands of euros, providing an economic advantage over conventional systems found in the Gulf that cost several million and are geared toward more traditional threats, such as ballistic missiles.⁸

While still in a state of war, Ukraine began exporting its expertise through bilateral ‘Drone Deals,’ special agreements marketing production and supply of drones and other weaponry along with software and training, in exchange for resources required by Ukraine to sustain itself⁹. These partnerships simultaneously boost Kyiv’s international profile and increase its partners’ stake in helping to resolve the war in Ukraine as well—adjusting the asymmetry in size and economic power between Russia and Ukraine when it comes to international support.

The GCC-Ukraine Partnership

Drones accounted for around 75% of the more than 6,500 Iranian attacks targeting the GCC countries, creating an urgent demand for the very capabilities that Ukraine has developed.¹⁰ Ukraine’s response was rapid — over 200 Ukrainian experts were deployed to the Gulf shortly after the Iranian strikes began to share expertise on protecting infrastructure and civilians, pointing to an emerging trans-regional lessons learned culture.¹¹

This operational responsiveness underpinned President Zelenskyy’s diplomatic tour of the Gulf between March and May to discuss security and defence cooperation and offer Drone Deals.¹² Zelenskyy announced that the visits resulted in the signing of 10-year defence cooperation agreements with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and confirmed ongoing discussions with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan.¹³ These agreements are bilateral and capability-driven, with little political conditionality, making them attractive to GCC states diversifying defence partnerships beyond the US. Kyiv also offered expertise in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, building on its experiences with breaking the Russian blockade in the Black Sea and developing unique naval drone technology.¹⁴ The decade-long timeline of the agreements signals a long-term intent, and while GCC states maintain engagement with Russia, they are not expanding defence cooperation with Moscow at the same scale. In exchange for Ukraine’s expertise, the Gulf countries have committed financial assistance, and supplies of Patriot missile and energy, notably diesel, to Ukraine.¹⁵

The speed of GCC-Ukraine engagement during the recent crisis was streamlined thanks to their intensified engagement since 2022, which included Ukraine’s active diplomacy, the hosting, by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, of several formats of peace talks, UAE and Qatari mediation of prisoner exchanges and return of kidnapped Ukrainian children, Gulf investments in energy and agriculture in Ukraine, humanitarian aid to Ukraine, supply of Ukrainian grain to the wider Middle East, and the signing of the Ukraine-GCC Joint Action Plan (2025-2030) spanning cooperation in energy, technology, food security, and science. Ukraine also opened an embassy in Oman in 2024 and is planning to exchange embassies with Bahrain.¹⁶

Beyond defence and food security, opportunities for Ukraine-GCC cooperation include logistics, trade corridors, investments, Ukraine’s future reconstruction, and mining and critical raw materials to reduce defence supply chain vulnerabilities in the long run, with potential benefits for European defence industries as well.¹⁷

The GCC-Ukraine partnership is also embedded in a broader regional realignment that further bolsters Ukraine’s trans-regional role, notably through its evolving ties with Türkiye — another key drone producer and a NATO member — and Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Both Ankara and Damascus have also deepened ties with Gulf states in recent years, with the former in particular emerging as a rising GCC defence partner with a military base in Qatar. In this context, it is noteworthy that Turkish defence manufacturers such as Baykar, which produces the Bayraktar drones, established production facilities in Ukraine¹⁸. Gulf investments could help finance drone and technology production in Ukraine but also assist with GCC localisation goals and lead to establishing Ukrainian production facilities in the GCC, expanding international partnerships of defence majors such as the Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and the UAE’s EDGE Group. These developments further anchor Ukraine’s future role in security in the Gulf and the wider Middle East and highlight the growing interconnectedness with the Black Sea region.

However, the GCC-Ukraine partnership is not without its constraints. GCC states continue to maintain significant economic and political ties with Russia, including through energy market coordination and multi-billion investments and joint ventures, creating incentives to avoid alienating Moscow, further reinforced by its permanent UN Security Council seat and position in the BRICS and other fora.¹⁹ The trajectory of the Iran War and the broader regional security environment will also shape whether GCC and Ukraine maintain shared threat perceptions and whether the Gulf states continue to resist choosing sides. Another issue could be linked to the security situation in Ukraine and any potential conditions of a post-war settlement. While the current dynamics favours deepening GCC-Ukraine ties, this calculus could potentially shift over time. The partnerships will require continuous efforts and sustained political will on both sides to be fully implemented and expanded.

Implications for Europe

These developments carry direct implications for the European Union (EU), which has in the past two months expressed willingness to take on a greater role in shaping the Gulf’s future security architecture, following decades of outsourcing security to the US. Both the EU and the GCC share an interest in expanding security partnerships beyond the US, building on a momentum of EU-GCC security dialogue and cooperation since 2022.²⁰ Yet, the EU as a bloc has yet to prove its ability to act as a credible security provider. The EU’s international ambitions and ability to rapidly deal with crises have often been constrained by its complex decision-making processes among its 27 member states and gaps between its rhetoric and operational capabilities. As a result, security and defence cooperation with the GCC has relied on bilateral initiatives led by individual member states, such as France and Italy.

The triangular connection between the EU, the GCC and Ukraine links two theatres that European capitals have too often treated separately. It helps bridge the divide within the EU, bringing Nordic and Eastern European countries — focused on Russia — into engagement with Gulf and Hormuz security. As Ukrainian and European defence industries become increasingly intertwined — with more partners betting on Ukrainian expertise and innovation — Kyiv’s Gulf partnerships will also carry growing European industrial implications, from joint production facilities to technology transfer.²¹ Ukraine’s prospective EU membership adds another layer as the defence agreements signed with the GCC would eventually become part of the EU’s broader security architecture. Ukraine’s partnerships with the GCC also present an opportunity for the EU to boost its position in a strategically important region, which has viewed the EU largely as an economic power. The recent wave of engagements and affirmations of strengthening ties also serves as a signal from the GCC, EU and Ukraine to the outside world, particularly to Washington, Moscow and Tehran, that they are neither isolated nor paralysed.

EU’s defensive Operation Aspides has been facing resource constraints since its launch in 2024, particularly in terms of available naval assets, which is something the EU member states are now trying to address. The EU cannot present itself as a serious security partner to the GCC when its key operational presence in the region is so visibly under-resourced. Intelligence-sharing between the EU, Ukraine and GCC states should be expanded, while Ukrainian technical advisors could be embedded with Aspides to share counter-drone expertise and support testing of Ukrainian technology for maritime deployment. A Euro-Ukraine-GCC defence industrial-investment partnership focused on co-production of drone systems and interceptors could further link European defence integration goals with Gulf defence and localisation agendas and Ukraine’s emerging export capabilities.

The Axis Reversed

The Russia-Iran axis has, paradoxically, become one of the key drivers of security realignment across two theatres that were until recently treated as distinct. By generating shared vulnerabilities in both Ukraine and the Gulf, it has created the conditions for a new type of partnership — capability-driven, bilaterally structured, and largely outside traditional Western frameworks. The triangular dynamic linking the EU, Ukraine, and the GCC offers an opening to extend European strategic relevance into the Gulf. If Europe acts faster and with more flexibility, Kyiv’s Gulf partnerships could become a cornerstone of a broader European engagement in regional security. If not, Ukraine and the GCC will continue charting their own course — with or without the EU. The future security architecture linking Europe and the Gulf is likely to be built less through institutional design and more through operational partnerships and flexible regional coalitions forged under pressure by countries with shared threats and complementary capabilities, gradually institutionalising what began as necessity.