While Iranian missiles continue to rain down on the GCC and, consequently, redraw the maps of risk in the region, one important takeaway has crept into the public eye in recent days: Italy has gained, in just a few days, a stock of political credibility in the UAE that no Summit, in recent years, had managed to produce. In Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in the halls of power as well as in the newsrooms of the main newspapers, Rome is no longer perceived only as a commercial partner or a luxury tourist destination, but has become — in the lexicon of the crisis — a friendly and reliable country.

The turning point can be symbolically identified in the phone call between UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in the days immediately following the first Iranian missile attacks against Emirati territory. The state agency WAM released an account of the conversation that was exceptionally warm by diplomatic standards: explicit thanks for Italy’s condemnation of the attacks, appreciation for its support for UAE sovereignty, and above all the phrase “concrete solidarity,” a term deliberately used to distinguish those who speak from those who act.

To understand the true weight of this perception, it is necessary to read both institutional statements and Emirati Arabic-language press. In this information ecosystem — from the WAM agency to Gulf News, from The National to Arabic-language newspapers such as Al Khaleej and Al Bayan — Italy occupies a space that is certainly limited, but growing—and consistently positive. Crucial, in this framework, is the distinction that Meloni herself was keen to reiterate: Italy is not at war with Iran, it does not allow offensive use of its bases, but it is willing to protect those who have been attacked. Being defensive, but not neutral, has proven compatible with what defines the UAE in this crisis: it is a country under attack asking for protection. It is not a belligerent seeking confrontation.

The most significant paradigm shift in the UAE perception of Italy concerns the military-defence dimension. Rome’s decision to make air defence systems and anti-drone capabilities available to its GCC partners, announced as part of a broader European commitment, has been received in the UAE as the clearest and most unequivocal signal of alignment.

In particular, Italy is preparing to send at least one SAMP/T missile battery (Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain). The system, developed through Franco-Italian collaboration by MBDA, is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and high-altitude drones — precisely the types of weapons used by Iran against the Emirates.

To fully understand the advantage acquired by Rome, it is necessary to place Italy’s positioning within the broader European framework — and the comparison is not flattering for many other continental partners.

At the moment when Iranian missile attacks struck UAE territory, European chancelleries responded with markedly different speed and tones. Paris, Berlin and London issued a joint statement on 1 March, defining the attacks as ‘indiscriminate and disproportionate’ — while specifying in the same document that they had ‘not participated’ in the US-Israeli attacks and preferred a ‘negotiated solution.’ For the GCC states, struck at the heart of their physical security, that double clause — condemnation plus distance — had a bitter taste, a kind of half-hearted solidarity. On the contrary, Rome does not bear the weight of an initially hesitant reaction.

Paris later realigned itself, announcing the dispatch of ships and air defence systems to Cyprus, but the UAE perception of France remains burdened by that first signal of hesitation and by the traditional Gaullist approach, which tends to preserve strategic ambiguity as a tool of influence, an approach poorly digested in the Gulf monarchies at this moment of acute crisis. Germany represents, in this framework, the most critical case. Berlin joined the joint statement without announcing significant operational contributions, weighed down by a structural perception of limited military projection in the Middle East and by a political class perceived as historically more inclined toward dialogue with Tehran—a legacy of the JCPOA years. The UK occupies a more solid position: London has the advantage of a long military history in the region and has announced the dispatch of warships and the granting of its bases to US forces. But an Iranian drone struck a Royal Air Force base in the Mediterranean, dragging London into a logic of direct involvement that creates internal pressures that are difficult to manage. At the opposite end of the spectrum lies Spain. Madrid invoked ‘respect for international law,’ openly criticised the US-Israel strikes, and refused to make its bases available to US forces—a decision that generated explicit irritation from President Trump. In the UAE media, Spain is the European pole furthest from GCC sensibilities.

What emerges clearly is that Rome has benefited from a positioning advantage that was far from guaranteed, built on three elements that have combined favourably:

1. the absence of a prior mediating role with Tehran—Italy does not carry the same baggage as Berlin and Paris, which during the JCPOA years had invested heavily in dialogue with Iran and which today pay the price of that history as a limit to their credibility in the eyes of the GCC states.
2. consistency between words and actions—the government’s statements were followed by concrete operational commitments, a link that the GCC values.
3. the political formula adopted by Meloni — defensive but not neutral — has found a natural resonance in the UAE—that they are victims of aggression seeking protection, not belligerents looking for escalation.

The sustainability of UAE goodwill to Italy depends largely on maintaining the current political line. If Rome were to experience significant internal pressures — parliamentary, public opinion, economic sector — pushing it toward a more equidistant posture, perceptions in the UAE may change rapidly. The GCC states have little tolerance for what they call ‘European strategic ambiguity,’ and the risk that Italy may slip into that category has not been fully averted, especially considering some unhappy precedents (the crisis in relations following the Conte I government’s 2019 decision to suspend the export of arms and security devices to the Gulf, a decision later revoked in 2023 by the current government).

At this crucial turning point in Middle Eastern history, Italy has made a clear, recognisable, and appreciated choice of side in the eyes of the UAE. It is not the choice of one going to war, but of one deciding to stand on one precise side of history. For the Emirates — which are seeking reliable international backing while facing the most acute crisis in their history — this distinction matters greatly. And the European ‘report card’ emerging from the crisis suggests that, at least for now, Rome has done better than its main partners. That stock of credibility, however, does not preserve itself: it must be cultivated with the same consistency with which it was built.