Five years have elapsed since the signing of the China-Iran cooperation agreement. China’s Middle East strategy is now being reshaped by a rapidly escalating crisis centred on the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic chokepoint has become an active conflict zone, and the Strait has been severely disrupted with Iranian forces effectively restricting transit through reported mining and attacks on commercial vessels. Hundreds of tankers are currently stranded along the shores of the Gulf. Most recently – in this ever-evolving situation – Iran has opened the Strait to some vessels and continues to restrict others, turning the Strait of Hormuz into a politically controlled corridor rather than a neutral trade route.

The result is the partial disruption of one of the world’s most important energy routes. Around 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, and the resulting disruption has already forced Gulf producers to reroute exports, reduce output, and rely on limited alternatives. Energy infrastructure across the region has also been affected, causing oil prices to rise sharply and fuelling concerns about a prolonged global supply shock.

For China, this is no longer a hypothetical vulnerability; it is an immediate risk. A significant portion of its energy mix (its oil and gas imports) depends on Hormuz, particularly from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. While China maintains a strategic partnership with Iran, the current crisis highlights a key contradiction: Iran is both an energy partner and the primary source of instability threatening the route on which China relies most.

This puts China in a difficult position. Its long-standing strategy of balancing relations across the region while avoiding security entanglements is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as the Strait of Hormuz shifts from a shared economic space to a contested military zone. The more Iran uses the Strait as a strategic tool, the greater the risk to China’s broader Gulf interests. At the same time, China remains dependent on a security system that is beyond its control. The US is now assembling a coalition to reopen the Strait, including the deployment of forces and the targeting of Iranian capabilities. For Beijing, the implications are clear. Its economic model in the Gulf, built on access, connectivity, and stable flows, is being tested by a reality in which access can be interrupted, controlled, or weaponised. The Strait of Hormuz is not a chokepoint but a pressure point.

Some analysts argue that Beijing no longer views Iran as a genuine strategic partner, with the relationship being portrayed as largely commercial in nature. However, China played a key diplomatic role in mediating the restoration of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 and has consistently emphasised Iran’s importance in regional diplomacy and energy security. These actions suggest that the relationship is more complex and strategically layered than is often assumed.

The stability of critical maritime routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, is taking precedence over any single bilateral relationship, including that with Iran. While Beijing is unlikely to abandon Tehran, its strategic focus is gradually shifting towards partners that can ensure reliable energy flows and maritime security. Recent developments have emphasised that safeguarding supply chains requires more than just economic engagement; maintaining the conditions that allow these networks to function is also essential. In this context, keeping the Strait of Hormuz open has become central to China’s regional strategy, influencing both its diplomatic stance and its expanding network of partnerships in the Gulf.

Sources:

• https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026
• https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mapped-the-worlds-oil-chokepoints/
• https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-january-february-crude-imports-surge-higher-refinery-throughput-2026-03-10/
• https://mecouncil.org/publication/asia-and-the-iran-conflict-energy-vulnerability-and-the-imperative-for-action/
• https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/the-china-iran-partnership-and-the-limits-of-beijings-non-interference-alliance-model/