In a world in which bad neighbours make bad neighbourhoods, and bad neighbourhoods generate instability, Israel has developed a long-standing approach that it must be able to choose good neighbours and partners. The country’s recent recognition of Somaliland, as part of an expanded effort to relaunch the Abraham Accords Process, reflects this strategy. Israel, a country long at odds with states in the Horn of Africa and around the Gulf of Aden has, in recognising Somaliland, created a useful ally in the region.
The plight of Somaliland is hardly new—the breakaway region on the Northern coast of Somalia has long struggled for independence and recognition. Originally a British colony, it joined into union with the rest of the country that had previously been under Italian occupation, in 1960. However political and cultural differences have since driven the two states apart. Unlike other secessionist movement in Africa, Somaliland’s is not driven by ethnicity such as in Azawad or Biafra, or by religion as in the case of South Sudan, it was driven by a difference in political philosophy. Somaliland has been much more resistant to religious extremism than the rest of the country, and has maintained a semblance of a much more democratic society. It was therefore much easier for Israel to find common ground in Somaliland than amongst other neighbours in the region that have to had contend with political and religious extremism.
What Israel has done in recognising Somaliland is threefold:
- It has demonstrated that the Abraham Accords Process is still alive and well, and invites others to take part.
- It redresses concerns over the balance of power in the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
- It showcases the renewal of an old Israeli strategy towards small state realism when it comes to engagement with newer and smaller actors that can be turned into reliable allies.
In the first instance, the push to revive and expand the Abraham Accords process is is important for Israel and will form an integral part of its strategy towards rebuilding trust in the Islamic World. The sustained war in Gaza, which followed the October 7th terrorist attacks on Israel (2023), harmed the country’s standing in the Middle East greatly, and put the brakes on the thawing of relations with other potential partners in the region. By opening relations with Somaliland, a Muslim majority, non-Arab country, in the region, it has broken the ice on the possibility for signing new agreements with other countries. The opportunity now exists for other states to follow suit.
With the second Trump Administration now firmly in office, the timing seems right to relaunch the Abraham Accords process. However it is obvious that the Israeli government, which is not immune to criticism from the US in recent months following the end of the war in Gaza, has work to do to prove that it is still a viable project for the Administration to invest time in.
Furthermore, the re-opening of the process serves as an attempt to help garner further support for wider international recognition of Somaliland. As it stands, despite fulfilling all of the theoretical criteria for statehood, Somaliland still lacks major international recognition. So far only Israel has openly recognised the country, with Taiwan as the only other country to have hinted at recognition remaining ambiguous on the topic.
The recognition of Somaliland however is about far more than opening relations with another state from the Islamic world. It presents a strategic opportunity for Israel and the West more broadly. Somaliland sits in a strategically important position, near the entryway to one of the worlds busiest shipping channels — the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits — connecting the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden, to the Suez Canal via the Red Sea. More than 12% of global seaborne trade flows through the straits each year, equivalent to more than $2 trillion worth of goods from Asia to Europe and beyond.
For more than two years, since October 2023, trade through the region has been subject to attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. Such acts of piracy have had a profound impact on trade in the region, to the extent that Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat declared bankruptcy and closed.
Having an ally on the other side of the Gulf of Aden provides a greater degree of security for transiting trade vessels. This would especially be true if Western countries secure naval basing rights in the new country. Given that China — another ally of Iran which has remained uncritical of the Houthi’s attacks on trade in the region and has seemingly been immune to these acts of piracy — already maintains a naval base in neighbouring Djbouti, the struggle to keep control of the Straits should draw much more attention.
Israeli, and perhaps in the future GCC, investment in Somaliland and its maritime infrastructure has the potential to benefit nations navigating the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits but also Somaliland itself. Generating new economic prosperity would guarantee stability in the region. Not to mention the change to the regional dynamics it would present by once again giving Ethiopia reliable access to a port via its allies in Somaliland, compensating for the loss of access to Port Sudan as a result of the civil war.
Finally, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland marks a return to foreign policy making that goes back to the 1948 founding of the state. Since its beginning, Israel has set itself up to be the friend of other small states. In the 1960’s Israel was amongst the first countries to open up relations with the newly independent city state of Singapore. Within a few years, Israel and Singapore had begun cooperation in a number of areas, including trade, investment, and defence. Israeli defence advisors were sent to Singapore to help establish the armed forces, including working on doctrine, training, and procurement. By the 1980’s and 1990’s Israel and Singapore were working on civilian cooperation as well, with projects focused on shared challenges related to water management and urban development.
Singapore is not alone in this ‘geopolitical adoption’ approach to engaging with small states. Israel has long maintained an unlikely alliance with Azerbaijan, focused again on defence cooperation and research agreements. Equally, this move towards engaging in the politics of the Horn of Africa is also not a first for Israel, historically they have fostered close ties with Ethiopia (owing to its previously large Jewish community), and with Kenya focused on security cooperation.
The opening of cooperation with Somaliland is simply the continuation of an approach towards taking ‘newer’ and smaller states under their wing. Somaliland, with a population of around 6 million people, and having long looked for reliable international partners, is a natural next step for Isreal’s engagement in the region.
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It is clear from Israel’s actions in the Horn of Africa that this is an earnest attempt to set out that the Abraham Accords still have life in them. It’s a signal to the US, and to the Islamic World, that Israel is serious about building relationships in its wider neighbourhood again. Recognising Somaliland also sets out that Israel is not afraid to take risks in supporting those who are willing to align with them in a region that is looks set to remain looked in great power rivalry.