On 05 July 2025, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made his first public appearance since the outbreak of the 12-day war with Israel, attending the ceremony on the eve of Ashura. The appearance followed reports that access to Khamenei had been restricted during the conflict, amid heightened concerns over internal security and the risk of targeted strikes. Nonetheless, the regime appears to have absorbed the impact of the Israeli offensive: its leadership structure remains functional, and core command and control functions are operational. However, the war exposed critical vulnerabilities, including gaps in Iran’s air defence systems, intelligence penetrations at the highest levels, and the fragility of its regional deterrence architecture. While the Islamic Republic has long been described as strategically ‘anti-fragile,’ the events of June 2025 raise a more immediate question: to what extent is the system still capable of absorbing and adapting to external shocks without sustaining long-term structural damage?
This invites a deeper historical reflection: what makes regimes collapse. Ibn Khaldun wrote that dynasties have a natural life span like individuals. In his Muqaddimah, he introduced the concept of ʿAsabiyyah, often translated as social cohesion, group feeling, or collective solidarity, as the core force behind a regime’s rise to power. As this internal cohesion weakens, Ibn Khaldun argued, the ruling structure begins to decay from within, eventually giving way to a new force capable of supplanting it. Each dynasty, in his view, carries within it the seeds of its own decline.
But in the case of the Islamic Republic, survival in the latest crisis was not secured solely by internal structures or ideological cohesion; it was influenced by external restraint. US President Donald Trump stated that he blocked an Israeli plan to kill Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, citing concerns that such a strike would have led to uncontrolled escalation. While Israeli leadership reportedly saw the war as a strategic opportunity to target not only Iran’s military infrastructure but also its ruling system, the US had different priorities. In other words, Israel pierced the armour, but the blade stopped at the neck because many in Washington, Riyadh, and even Europe feared the vacuum more than the villain. This outcome recalls the late Ottoman Empire, which endured decades beyond its effective power because European powers were unable to agree on how to divide its territory. A similar situation may be unfolding today.
Trump moved quickly to de-escalate the conflict, consistent with his political mandate to avoid new US wars in the Middle East. Shifts in US strategic thinking, and Gulf concerns about regional instability, effectively spared the Iranian regime from collapse. If Trump’s account is accurate, they may have even spared Khamenei’s life.
Nonetheless, this pattern of restraint has not been consistent. In January 2020, President Trump authorised the drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force and the chief architect of Iran’s regional proxy network. Four years later, under President Biden, Israel eliminated Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, striking at the second pillar of Tehran’s horizontal deterrence. Together, those operations decapitated the leadership of Iran’s two most important expeditionary assets and exposed the growing vulnerability of the ‘axis of resistance.’
So, now, the pressing question is whether a chastened Tehran can translate into concrete gains for regional security and diplomacy, or whether its regime, bruised yet unbroken, will channel its remaining leverage in ways that offset any potential benefits. But to assess this, we must approach the challenge as a two-level equation. On one level, we need to understand how a weakened Iran affects the capabilities and behaviour of its regional proxies. On the other, we must consider how the degradation of those proxies, in turn, undermines Iran’s ability to project power, deter adversaries, and bargain from a position of strength.
The Decline of the Outer Shell
Iran’s network of proxies is the outer shell of its security architecture: it turns local factions into forward sensors, shock absorbers, and bargaining chips, giving Tehran strategic depth it cannot achieve with regular forces alone. These peripheral assets enable Tehran to strike or threaten far beyond its borders while retaining plausible deniability, effectively converting limited resources into region‑wide leverage.
Israel recognises that Iranian proxies are the centre of gravity in Tehran’s regional strategy. Accordingly, Israel uses a deterrence-by-denial strategy, carrying out regular, targeted strikes to weaken enemy capabilities before they fully develop. It combines this with occasional punishment attacks and quick tactical moves, creating constant pressure that keeps Iran’s forces and proxies scattered, unstable, and expensive to support. Israel also understands that Iranian‑backed militias survive on more than battlefield wins; research on terrorist decision‑making shows such groups derive staying power from ‘process’ goals; revenge attacks, the glorification of leaders, and headline‑grabbing operations that reassure sympathisers the fight continues even when strategic objectives stall.
Over the past year Tel Aviv has worked methodically to deny Hezbollah those very milestones: the September 2024 air‑strike that killed Nasrallah removed the movement’s most potent symbol, while a rolling campaign of precision raids has destroyed weapons depots, bunkers and tunnels in the south of Lebanon.
The weakening of Hezbollah represents a strategic calamity for Iran, not merely a tactical setback. As Tehran’s most capable and loyal proxy, Hezbollah functions as both a deterrent shield and an offensive lever. Moreover, its integration into Lebanese politics gave Iran a unique hybrid asset: a state-embedded militia with regional reach.
Last year, Iran also lost the keystone of its regional design when the Assad regime fell. Syria offered a land bridge to Lebanon, enabling Tehran to sustain and arm Hezbollah, while maintaining strategic depth against Israel. Beyond its logistical value, Syria served as a forward operating zone for Iranian intelligence and Quds Force personnel, facilitating power projection across the Levant. The Assad regime’s alignment with Tehran also provided critical political cover and ideological continuity within the so-called Axis of Resistance.
In Yemen, the Houthi movement supplies a maritime flank that no other proxy can replicate. Control of territory overlooking the Bab el Mandeb chokepoint lets Iran threaten 10 % of global seaborne trade and force Saudi Arabia to defend its Red Sea coastline. Nonetheless, recent US strikes on Yemen’s Houthis have inflicted significant damage on the group’s military infrastructure, eliminating key commanders and degrading operational capacity. US forces have systematically targeted weapons depots, missile platforms, drone launch sites, and command-and-control hubs, delivering cumulative blows to the Houthis’ ability to wage sustained asymmetric warfare. And, with Houthi capabilities degraded, Iran faces a shrinking map of influence.
Local Political Reordering After Proxy Decline
The weakening of Iran’s proxy network triggered quiet but meaningful shifts across the Middle East; loosening militia control, opening space for political reform, and allowing local populations to reclaim long-suppressed agency. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s weakening is yielding notable shifts in both symbolism and substance. Arrival into the country used to be marked by ubiquitous banners bearing the portraits of Qasem Soleimani and Hassan Nasrallah, visible reminders of Iran’s occupation of the small country. In recent months, however, these banners have been replaced with “new era for Lebanon” posters, signalling a quiet but meaningful loosening of Hezbollah’s psychological grip. Politically, the election of President Joseph Aoun, a former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces and not the Hezbollah-backed candidate Sleiman Frangieh, marks a turning point.
Under the leadership of Aoun, the Lebanese Army has begun implementing arms-control measures in line with the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The president has also actively sought to repair Lebanon’s strained relations with key Arab states, which had cooled due to Hezbollah’s influence. Recently, Aoun made a visit to the United Arab Emirates, the first official presidential visit in years, signalling Beirut’s intent to pivot back toward the Gulf.
In Syria, for years the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operated with impunity—building underground bases, stockpiling weapons, and training thousands of fighters across the country. Their presence extended beyond the battlefield: locals endured years of harassment, illegal land seizures, and the spread of Iranian-linked drug trafficking routes that destabilised communities. But that chapter closed. With Assad’s departure and the weakening of Iranian influence, IRGC-linked facilities have been abandoned or destroyed. For the first time in over a decade, Syria has a genuine chance to recover, not just from war, but from the foreign domination that came with it, and to be reintegrated into the Arab and international systems on its own terms.
In short, as Iranian proxies weaken, countries across the region are regaining the sovereignty those groups had stripped away.
The Limits of Military Instrumentality in Asymmetric Conflict Systems
While Iran’s proxies have suffered significant setbacks, their underlying structures remain embedded in the political and security fabric of the region. These groups retain social bases, logistical networks, and ideological coherence that allow them to persist—even in a weakened state. Their current decline may reflect strategic retreat, not irreversible collapse, and under favourable conditions, they retain the capacity to regenerate, adapt, and once again exert destabilising influence.
As previously noted, Hezbollah has been strategically weakened, but it remains deeply entrenched within Lebanon’s political system. It retains a significant bloc in parliament and continues to block key reforms, such as legislation to allow diaspora voting. Beyond formal politics, Hezbollah maintains a loyal support base, extensive patronage networks, and a capacity to mobilise street-level coercion. While President Aoun and Lebanese authorities have pledged to pursue disarmament, few inside the country believe full disarmament is achievable. Moreover, Hezbollah’s threat to Lebanon’s stability does not rest solely on its missile arsenal aimed at Israel, but on its internal instruments of power: political obstruction, targeted assassinations, and paramilitary intimidation. And if its position becomes too precarious, Hezbollah can pivot toward a hybrid model—seeking partial integration with the Lebanese Armed Forces, similar to how Iran-aligned militias in Iraq have institutionalised their presence while maintaining de facto autonomy. The structure remains adaptable, even under pressure.
This structural adaptability is not unique to Hezbollah. Iran’s other proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen, have demonstrated even greater resilience in the face of external pressure. In some ways, the Houthis offer Tehran strategic advantages that surpass those of Hezbollah. Their geographic distance from Israel limits the reach and frequency of Israeli military operations. Moreover, their entrenchment within Yemen’s tribal networks and their operation in rugged, mountainous terrain make them far harder to isolate or neutralise through conventional force. Unlike Hezbollah, which must navigate the constraints of formal political institutions, the Houthis maintain insurgent flexibility while exercising de facto control over territory; giving Iran a durable, low-cost lever of influence on the Arabian Peninsula.
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Despite the apocalyptic tone that dominated media and social platforms in recent weeks, the Iranian regime did not fall, nor did the world plunge into World War III. History reminds us that authoritarian systems often endure, not because they are strong, but because their collapse is deemed more dangerous than their survival. The Islamic Republic remains intact largely because the alternative is feared, not because the state is unchallenged. What did shift, however, and profoundly so, was the architecture of Iranian influence abroad.
In 2025, Tehran’s proxy network suffered its most serious setbacks since its emergence. This does not mean the system has unravelled. These networks are adaptive by design and deeply embedded in state and societal structures. But for the first time in years, their decline allowed fragile states like Lebanon and Syria to reclaim slices of sovereignty long denied to them. It is a bitter irony that while the Iranian people remain trapped under an ageing regime, the weakening of its foreign proxies has brought unexpected openings for the people of the region. The strategic question now is whether these openings can be consolidated, or whether this moment will be remembered merely as an interlude between two waves of instability.
If there is a lesson to be drawn from this year, it is that military pressure can weaken proxies, disrupt supply lines, and decapitate leadership, but it cannot, on its own, dismantle the political and social ecosystems that sustain them. What politics does not ratify, force alone cannot resolve.