On 28 February, Italian officials must have been really worried when they saw the news. The war in the Gulf increases national security risks and presents Italy with difficult dilemmas. However, the economic dimension of the crisis makes it even more problematic for Italy. The GCC countries, with their extraction plants, are currently being targeted by Iranian attacks, and the Hormuz Strait is essentially closed. This has disrupted around a fifth of global oil and gas trade. In recent years, Italy has actually put cooperation with these countries at the centre of its foreign and energetic policy.(1) The disruption of energy supply from those states has led to Gulf governments requesting assistance. The government must now strike a balance between its unwillingness to engage in the conflict and its desire to support its regional allies. Complicating matters further, rising gas and oil prices may lead to popular discontent, while Prime Minister Meloni must coordinate with both other EU leaders and the US. The Italian response to the crisis will be analysed in this article from a variety of different perspectives.
From a military point of view, there is one clear take: Italy is not willing to enter directly in the conflict. This position was expressed by the Superior Council of Defense, chaired by the President of the Italian Republic Mattarella, on the 13th of March. The position is in line with article 11 of the Italian Constitution and it takes into account the security concerns related to terrorism threats and potential Iranian targets within Italian borders. However, it was also reaffirmed how the NATO and US bases on Italian territory can be used by the allies for logistical and training activities supporting military operations.(2) This last point is one of the main matters of friction with the opposition parties, which are worried about potential involvement of Italy in the war.(3) On the other hand, Italy is currently part of the European mission aimed at protecting Cyprus, an EU member targeted by an Iranian attack on the 2nd of March, thus aligning its efforts to the ones of other EU countries like Spain, France and The Netherlands in accordance with art. 42.7 of the TEU, which requires member states to support each other in case of military attack.(4)

Although Italy does not want to participate in the conflict, the government has made it clear that it will meet the requests of some GCC allies for defensive support. The intent was confirmed by a resolution approved by the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 5th of March.(5) This approach is aimed at preserving the strategic relation with the GCC countries and it also reflects the need to protect national assets and citizens (almost 100,000 individuals) in the region. Apparently, the government has decided to send defensive anti-drone and anti-missiles systems to the countries that asked for help (Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE). Italy will provide mainly for ant-drones and radar technologies. The government is also considering sending a SAMP/T, an anti-missile system, to Kuwait and the UAE, but the decision is still under debate due to limited availability of this specific asset within Italian military apparatus and it needs the approval of the Parliament. The possible sending also of a frigate is under discussion.(6)

The Italian response is not confined to military decisions. The economic setbacks of this crisis will be severe for the Peninsula due to the disruptions in energy supply. Italy is extremely reliant on oil and gas imports from GCC countries, in particular on Qatari LNG, which accounts for 6.4 billion cubic metres to the peninsula, 10% of total gas imports.(7) QatarEnergy has declared force majeure related to long-term contracts signed with several countries, including Italy. Therefore, Rome is trying to draft a strategy to tackle energy shortages and ballooning prices. This is the context of Prime Minister Meloni’s visit to Algeria on 25 March. Rome hopes to import even more gas from the North African country, which currently accounts for 31% of Italy’s gas imports, primarily via the Transmed pipeline. However, obstacles to Meloni’s strategy remain. Firstly, Algeria intends to sell additional gas through the spot market, outside of existing long-term contracts. This method is more expensive. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether Sonatrach, Algeria’s national oil and gas company, has the capacity to increase exports, given its outdated infrastructure and growing domestic demand for energy. Competitors in Europe are also a concern. Spain has expressed an intention to buy more Algerian gas, thus competing with Italy. At any rate, a thorough Italian energy plan is yet to be formulated. The initial steps can just be looked at, like the decision to postpone the shutdown of coal power plants until 2038.(8)

The Italian response to the Gulf Crisis is a mix of cautiousness and pragmatism. Rome has to govern the tension between not entering the conflict and providing assistance to its strategic allies in the region. The war is not just affecting Italian military strategy and geopolitical positioning, but it has economic costs as well. Gas and oil prices are soaring and the government needs to manage the disruption in the energy supply, which echoes the 2022 blockade of fuels imports from Russia. Like at the beginning of the Invasion of Ukraine, Italy is confronted with the risks of its dependence on foreign suppliers. Without an adequate response, popular discontent may start to rise. Now, Rome is called to set up a comprehensive long term energetic strategy aimed at de-risking and reducing costs for its households and companies, which as of today pay much higher energy prices than the European average.

Sources:

(1) the-role-of-gcc-countries-in-italys-energy-strategy
(2) consiglio-difesa-si-all-uso-basi-italia-rispetto-accordi-internazionali-AISF3KwB
(3) meloni-litalia-non-e-in-guerra-ma-in-parlamento-fuoco-e-fiamme-420948
(4) iran-drone-colpisce-base-britannica-a-cipro
(5) si-della-camera-alla-difesa-aerea-per-i-paesi-del-golfo-e-aiuti-a-cipro-meloni-in-aula-l11–125939
(6)guerra-in-iran-dallitalia-armi-di-difesa-e-logistica-resta-il-nodo-samp-t-il-conflitto-in-medio-oriente-ba6787c1-021a-434b-bbe6-3839348ecc72.html
(7)  dipendenza-energetica-italia-puo-sostituire-gnl-qatar
(8) centrali-carbone-accese-2038