The UK still has still not formally proscribed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation, months after previously indicating its intent to do so.

While the UK has sanctioned a number of IRGC-linked individuals, commanders and units, repeatedly denounced Iranian state threats, recognised the threat posed by Iran’s networks, proxies and intimidation overseas, it has yet to take this crucial legal step on proscription on the terrorist organisations list under the Terrorism Act 2000.

That distinction matters. Sanctions are not proscription. Tough speeches and press releases from Downing Street are not law.

While the UK Government confirmed at the King’s Speech (13 May) it will legislate to combat hostile foreign state entities and their proxies, of which will most likely include the IRGC, it merely restates its previous intention. Downing Street again, grasps for process, legal architecture and ‘future’ powers, rather grappling the IRGC nettle outright and immediately. Until the Government takes action, the IRGC question will continue to be caught in the same cycle policy it has faced all these years, concern, delay, consultation, review, repeat.

The IRGC is not a shadowy institution or fringe group of the Iranian regime. It is at the heart of Iran’s regional and global power projection, exporting terror and armed influence through militias, proxy networks, missiles, drones, maritime harassment and coercive pressure throughout the Middle East and beyond, including Europe.

For years, long before the Iran War, the GCC have felt the malign influence of the IRGC, including attacks on energy installations, shipping threats, backing of militias, and pressure focused the Strait of Hormuz. This is why the UK’s hesitation, despite its repeated declarations of intent, has a strategic cost. The UK often sees itself as a serious security partner in the Gulf. It has bases, most notably in the Naval Support Facility in Bahrain for nearly a century, defence ties, commercial connections and influence around the region. The UK also regularly leads maritime security through the UKMTO, countering malign activity. On the IRGC, however, the UK has not paved the way. It has followed.

The European Commission, normally accused of slow action and internal divisions, got ahead of the UK in the effort to designate the IRGC. This is a poor advertisement for a supposed post-Brexit Global Britain, assured in its agility, sovereignty and rapid decision-making. The UK should not have to wait for Brussels to budge first to get serious about the magnitude of the IRGC threat.

The delay is also especially jarring because the UK’s own security environment has adapted. Iranian-linked threats no longer occur exclusively in the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen. They have made their way onto European streets. Journalists, dissidents and critics of the regime have been intimidated far from Tehran. British soil has not escaped this same fate.

A further concern is the political clock ticking against Prime Minister Keir Starmer, with his leadership in question and time remaining in office uncertain. Legislation to proscribe can lag, be diluted or be overtaken by the ongoing Westminster melodrama over the Labour leadership. If the Government fails to advance legislation immediately, its fate remains in doubt.

Proscription on its own will not address the problem entirely of course. It will not dismantle the IRGC, end Iran’s proxy networks or eliminate the threat of escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. It will however toughen the UK’s international legal position, strengthen deterrence, signal seriousness to allies and make clear that support for the IRGC has criminal consequences in the British Isles. It will restore a semblance of British leadership and courage on this issue.

This Labour government should stop doing what it regularly defaults to, hiding behind process; advancing legislation at a snail’s pace. IRGC proscription should be expedited without further delay, and ensure new powers are sufficiently robust to be exercised and enforced, not just announced at the despatch box.

Starmer still has time to act, but not much. The UK has spoken about the IRGC threat for years, now it must finally name it, ban it and enforce the law against it. Anything less would confirm what allies in the US, Gulf and Europe increasingly suspect; on Iran, the UK talks like a security power but too often governs like a bystander.