After two weeks of the European Parliament’s Committee Hearings with the Commissioner-designates, it is clear that the European Union (EU) will seek to recalibrate its approach to the Gulf region and, more broadly, the Middle East. Given the changing geopolitical situation, the EU is being pushed to reconcile its value-based approach to foreign policy — which has been sometimes tainted by ideological agenda of the messengers — with one that aims to promote and safeguard its vital security interests. The EU is seeking to put more emphasis on leveraging its economic power to boost its influence across the world, including in the Middle East and the Gulf. Much of the efforts are driven by the wider aim to counter Russian, Chinese and Iranian influence and avoid leaving a vacuum for them to fill. The new Commission portfolio for the Mediterranean, which will be also responsible for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, shows the rising importance of the southern neighbourhood for the EU.

Two persons in the new College of Commissioners will be key for the EU’s foreign policy towards the Middle East: Kaja Kallas, the Estonian designated High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and Dubravka Šuica, the Croatian Commissioner-designate for the Mediterranean—although many other portfolios such as International Partnerships, and Trade and Economic Security, will be also very relevant due to the intentional overlaps. While Kallas should be more focused on the diplomatic track, Šuica will work on economic cooperation with the region. Together, the two will also develop the much-needed comprehensive EU Middle East Strategy, which will focus on achieving the two-state solution in Israel and Palestine and strengthening partnerships with key regional stakeholders, particularly the Gulf countries, with which the EU could also negotiate individual strategic partnerships. Kallas also emphasised the need to listen to the EU partners’ concerns and views when developing EU policies, while Šuica highlighted that EU would treat those countries as equals during partnership negotiations. The Gulf countries have also shown interest in building on the renewed engagement and the existing initiatives with the EU and the incoming administration. For example, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia was one of the first officials to meet with Kallas after her nomination as HR/VP.

Both Kallas and Šuica signalled that they view the Arab Gulf countries as partners in resolving conflicts in the Middle East as well as addressing the EU’s security interests. Achieving security and stability in the expansive region is a shared interest for the EU and the Gulf countries, who are in the middle of implementing their long-term economic transformation plans. The EU will work to help strengthen the Palestinian Authority and join efforts with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on reconstructing Gaza once the war is over. However, conflict resolution cooperation could go beyond the Middle East as some GCC countries have been diplomatically engaged on Ukraine, which continues to be a key concern for the EU.

The EU and GCC are important trade and investment partners but there is still much more potential for cooperation. The EU is interested in improving ties with the Gulf partners, notably through economic cooperation, trade, investments, (clean) energy, and connectivity projects. Those would include cooperation on supplying hydrogen and clean energy to the EU through the Southern Mediterranean corridor, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and Global Gateway projects, a trans-Mediterranean energy and clean tech cooperation initiative, joint investments in Central Asia, such as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, as well as cooperation on data cables, such as MEDUSA, and critical raw materials needed for the green and digital transformation.

While there is a positive view of engaging with the GCC, this is not the case for Iran. There seems to be a growing understanding in the EU regarding the interconnectedness of the various crises and conflicts in its neighbourhood, including in the Middle East and Ukraine, that benefit from an ever closer cooperation between actors such as Russia and Iran. The former Estonian Prime Minister, Kallas, who is poised to be the first EU High Representative hailing from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region, plans to focus on developing a tougher EU approach towards Iran, which would take into account Iranian interference in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Latin America. During her confirmation hearing on 12 November, Kallas placed Iran on an equal footing with Russia, North Korea and China as revisionist powers aiming to undermine and change the rules based order. Although, she twice avoided responding to whether she would press for listing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation in the EU, Kallas’ dealing with Iran will be very different from her predecessor. The incoming Commission seems to be more aligned with the European Parliament on the Iran file and could help quell tensions from the previous mandate.

Bringing a new understanding of security threats, Kallas will pivot from EU’s past approach towards the Gulf region, which was largely determined by efforts to sign, implement and later save the JCPOA, while ignoring the wider security implications of Iran’s destabilising activities across the Middle East — to the frustration of the Gulf countries — with implications for the EU’s security, including support for terrorist activities in the EU’s South-Eastern neighbourhood (Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis). Despite their recent diplomatic engagement with Iran, for most of the GCC countries, Tehran continues to represent a challenge. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine forced the EU to rethink its approach to the GCC countries, which mended their internal division a year earlier, and began a new era of engagement, culminating in the historic first EU-GCC Summit on 16 October 2024, in Brussels, that vowed to expand cooperation in trade, investment, energy, climate change, connectivity, security and people-to-people contacts. The focus on economic cooperation and the wider geo-economic competition also helped open the door for agreement to restart the long-stalled EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement negotiations. The incoming Commission will try to build on the Summit to expand cooperation with the Gulf and use this partnership to boost its influence in the region and beyond but will inevitably face tough competition and concerns not least regarding its legitimacy.

Geographic proximity binds Europe and the Middle East together. Unlike the US, the EU cannot afford to shift its focus away from the region and its many crises. For a successful strategy towards the Middle East, the EU must select the right partners who share common challenges and interests, while maintaining dialogue in areas where differences persist. The incoming EU administration seems to be sober and interest driven in its pursuit of cooperation with the Gulf countries and willing to listen and treat its partners as equals. However, with the increasing multitude of crises around the world, the EU’s attention will inevitably be spread out beyond the Middle East and the Gulf. Next year, in 2025, the EU plans Summits with Latin America and the Caribbean as well as the African Union, regions that are also consequential for EU’s security and future. Therefore, it will be crucial to capitalise on the numerous initiatives and high-level engagements between the EU and the GCC from recent years and leverage their international influence in other regions to help promote their common interests—sooner rather than later.